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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last week of its 2010–2011 term, the Supreme Court 
announced two decisions that held that the Due Process Clause1 prohibits 
state courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over foreign 
manufacturers in certain situations.  In Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Court held that foreign manufacturers’ 
sales of a limited quantity of goods in a state did not subject the 
manufacturers to personal jurisdiction in that state for deaths of state 
residents that occurred outside the state and were caused by products 
sold outside the state.2  The unanimous opinion categorically 
distinguished between general and specific personal jurisdiction,3 making 
                                                          
* Professor of Law and Mississippi Defense Lawyers Association Distinguished Lecturer, 
University of Mississippi School of Law.  I am grateful to Patrick J. Borchers, Joseph W. Glannon, 
Kermit Roosevelt III, and Michael E. Solimine for helpful comments on drafts of this Article. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  Though states have sovereign judicial power unless prohibited 
by state law or due process limits, the Court commonly writes as if federal law permits or authorizes 
jurisdiction.  E.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (“The Due Process Clause . . . permits 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in any State with which the defendant has ‘certain minimum 
contacts’ . . . .” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))).  Two Justices 
have recently asserted that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that state jurisdiction conforms to 
constitutional limits.  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
 2. 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
 3. See id. (agreeing with the North Carolina Court of Appeals that North Carolina courts 
lacked specific jurisdiction, but holding that North Carolina courts also lacked general jurisdiction).  
The Court had previously differentiated between specific and general jurisdiction, see infra notes 
108–09 and accompanying text, by borrowing terminology proposed by two prominent academics.  
As Professors von Mehren and Trautman explain: 
[A]ffiliations between the forum and the underlying controversy normally support only 
the power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or connected with, the very 
controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate.  This we call specific jurisdiction.  
On the other hand, American practice for the most part is to exercise power to adjudicate 
any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect, 
between the forum and the person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected.  This 
we call general jurisdiction.   
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clear that limited sales do not satisfy the “substantial” activity or 
“continuous and systematic” contacts required for general jurisdiction.4 
In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the Court held that a state 
court lacks personal jurisdiction over claims by a state resident against a 
foreign manufacturer that sells a defective product to a distributor in the 
state where it causes injury.5  Justice Ginsburg, author of the unanimous 
opinion in Goodyear Dunlop Tires, dissented in Nicastro, protesting that 
the holding departed from precedent and expressing concern with the 
new theory of jurisdiction offered by the plurality.6 
These decisions—the Court’s first major opinions to address 
constitutional limits on adjudicatory jurisdiction in two decades—
received little attention.  Released during the slow summer news cycle, 
they yielded the headlines to controversial First Amendment cases 
decided the same day.7  Goodyear Dunlop Tires, supported by a 
unanimous Court, predictably8 conformed to prior decisions that 
evidence the Court’s reluctance to permit general jurisdiction over 
corporations based upon claims unrelated to corporate activity in the 
forum state.  The decision received less attention than Nicastro, which  
 
                                                                                                                       
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). 
The contemporary use of general jurisdiction by courts and scholars corresponds to von 
Mehren and Trautman’s category of “unlimited general jurisdiction,” which they distinguished from 
quasi in rem jurisdiction.  Id. at 1136. 
 4. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 2853 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317–18). 
 5. 131 S. Ct. at 2785, 2791 (plurality opinion).  The Court failed to produce an opinion 
agreeable to a majority of its members.  Justice Kennedy, writing for four Justices, expressed strong 
reservations about the stream-of-commerce metaphor that had informed prior opinions.  Id. at 2788 
(“The stream of commerce, like other metaphors, has its deficiencies as well as its utility.”).  Justice 
Kennedy also adumbrated a theory of personal jurisdiction that requires a defendant to submit to the 
authority of a sovereign.  Id. at 2787–90; see also infra note 228. 
 6. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plurality’s notion that consent 
is the animating concept [of personal jurisdiction] draws no support from controlling decisions of 
this Court.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (holding that the 
First Amendment protects sales of violent video games to minors); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828–29 (2011) (holding that the First Amendment prevents 
states from providing funds to political candidates to match private funds raised by their opponents). 
 8. Cf. Email from author to Ronald J. Rychlak, Assoc. Dean, Univ. of Miss. Sch. of Law 
(March 8, 2011, 2:53 PM) (on file with author) (“I would like to apply for a summer research grant 
to support research on the following project[]: (1) evaluation of Supreme Court opinion (to be 
handed down in Goodyear v. Brown probably rejecting unanimously the idea of general jurisdiction 
based on third party sales) . . . .” (italics added)). 
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provoked a spirited dissent9 and was greeted with much criticism and 
alarm.10 
This Article reviews the Court’s latest word on due process limits on 
general personal jurisdiction.  The Court crafted the Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires opinion to provide needed guidance for lower courts.  Nevertheless, 
this Article contends that the opinion achieved consensus only because it 
can be read in radically different ways.  On the one hand, the Court 
framed its decision narrowly to establish that foreign manufacturers are 
not subject to general jurisdiction based on sporadic sales of products in 
the forum through intermediaries.11  On the other hand, the Court 
embraced a more general doctrine that limits general jurisdiction over 
corporations to places where they are “at home”12—their places of 
incorporation, principal places of business,13 and, perhaps, places where 
they engage in such substantial, continuous, and systematic activity that 
those places are comparable to principal places of business.14 
The opinion avoided dissension by omitting any discussion of the 
theoretical bases of jurisdiction and by withholding any examples of 
“substantial” or “systematic and continuous” activity.  The opinion’s 
narrowly framed issues and comparative evaluation of corporate 
activity15 can support a flexible approach that approves general 
jurisdiction in multiple states where a foreign corporation has strong 
                                                          
 9. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794–2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 10. Debra Cassens Weiss, Is International Shoe Getting the Boot?  Ginsburg Dissent Protests 
Jurisdictional Bar to Tort Suit, ABA J. (June 27, 2011, 2:03 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/is_international_shoe_getting_the_boot_ginsburg_dissent_protests_jurisdicti. 
Janice L. Heinhold, counsel of record for the plaintiff in Nicastro, observed that the decision 
“turned back the clock about 60 years” and provided a “roadmap for corporations” seeking to avoid 
liability for defective products in U.S. courts.  Telephone Interview with Janice L. Heinhold, Assoc., 
Rakoski & Ross, P.C. (July 1, 2011) (notes on file with author). 
 11. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011).  As the 
Court noted, “[M]ere purchases [made in the forum State], even if occurring at regular intervals, are 
not enough to warrant a State’s assertion of [general] jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a 
cause of action not related to those purchase transactions.”  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The narrow reading is evident from the opinion, which refers to the requirement of 
“continuous and systematic general business contacts” but does not employ the word “home” or 
phrase “at home” or suggest that such contacts must establish corporate presence comparable to the 
principal place of business.  Id. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416). 
 12. Id. at 2853–54 (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Tex. 
L. Rev. 721 (1998)). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 2851 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). 
 15. See generally id. at 2856–57 (discussing the contacts in Perkins and Helicopteros as 
compared to those in Goodyear Dunlop Tires). 
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permanent connections.  Yet its formal doctrines can equally support a 
restrictive approach that limits general jurisdiction to the place of 
incorporation and a place that is the functional equivalent of the principal 
place of business.  The opinion can thus be read as authority both for and 
against general jurisdiction in North Carolina over a corporation like 
Goodyear USA16 that operates factories and maintains extensive 
permanent sales facilities in North Carolina.17 
Part II provides historical context by reviewing the evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions requiring contacts or activity as the basis for 
jurisdiction over corporations.  This Part considers the typology of cases 
that establishes the starting point for the systematic distinction between 
general and specific jurisdiction. 
Part III discusses the Court’s decisions on general jurisdiction before 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires.  This Part shows how the Court has decided 
cases narrowly to avoid confronting a range of corporate activity that 
challenges the jurisdictional elements of presence and contacts. 
Part IV explores the Court’s treatment of general jurisdiction in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires.  It first explains how the opinion can be read in 
two different ways.  It then proposes a middle path that provides a fair 
reading of the opinion to avoid the narrowest and broadest possible 
constructions. 
Part V considers practical implications of the Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires decision and discusses its application in a number of recurring fact 
situations.  It shows how the decision closes the door on a few forms of 
general jurisdiction but opens new opportunities for expanding general 
jurisdiction by inviting arguments that a nonresident defendant has lost 
its status as foreign and become “at home” for purposes of litigation. 
While the Court achieved consensus on formal rules when those 
rules limit general personal jurisdiction, the consensus is unstable.  The 
Court’s contemporaneous restriction of specific personal jurisdiction in 
Nicastro creates new incentives for plaintiffs to invoke general 
jurisdiction.  This will require lower courts to confront—sooner rather 
than later—issues left unresolved by the Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
decision and its broad opinion. 
                                                          
 16. Goodyear USA was the parent company to petitioners Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, SA, 
Goodyear Lastikleri T.A.S., and Goodyear Dunlop Tires France, SA.  Id. at 2851–52. 
 17. The first question that Justice Ginsburg posed during oral argument concerned the grounds 
for jurisdiction over Goodyear USA.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76).  Nevertheless, the opinion does not address the issue.  See infra 
Part V.B.3. 
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II. EVOLUTION OF CONTACTS OR ACTIVITY AS THE BASIS FOR 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
This Part discusses the evolution of modern contacts-based limits on 
personal jurisdiction.  It examines leading cases that establish the 
common principles of personal jurisdiction widely shared by members of 
the Court. 
A. Pennoyer v. Neff 
Pennoyer v. Neff announced that the Due Process Clause prevents a 
state from enforcing its own default judgment that was recovered in an 
action in personam against a nonresident who did not appear in the state 
and who received only constructive service of process through notice 
published in a newspaper.18  The opinion committed the Court to 
imposing due process restrictions on state court jurisdiction and 
introduced a territorial theory of jurisdiction grounded on the twin 
propositions that (1) a state has “exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty 
over persons and property within its territory” and (2) “the laws of one 
State have no operation outside of its territory . . . [and] no tribunal 
established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to 
subject either persons or property to its decisions.”19  The opinion 
approved of a sovereign’s jurisdiction over all residents and over any 
nonresidents who consent to jurisdiction.20  It approved of the exercise of 
                                                          
 18. 95 U.S. 714, 719–20, 736 (1877).  But see Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General 
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 121 (arguing that grounding limits on personal jurisdiction 
in the Constitution is an “unfortunate mistake”). 
 19. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS §§ 539–41, 543 (Boston 1834)).  Justice Field, writing for the Court in Pennoyer, derived the 
two regulatory principles from doctrines of public law found in Story’s treatise that were based in 
turn on civil law authorities.  See generally STORY, supra, §§ 530–37 (discussing authorities).  The 
Court in Pennoyer applied these two principles to hold that attachment of property to satisfy a 
judgment could not occur before a party acquired the property.  Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727–28 
(finding that “the jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and determine [a non-resident’s] obligations 
at all is only incidental to its jurisdiction over the property”).  It is not obvious why the territorial 
focus should be on the location of the person at the time of the original service of process. 
The Court explained that the default judgment “if void when rendered, will always remain 
void.”  Id. at 728.  Professor Linda J. Silberman observes that the holding in Pennoyer “that the 
Oregon court could not exercise jurisdiction over Neff’s property because it had not been attached at 
the outset of the action . . . is difficult to reconcile . . . with the theory underlying [the holding].” 
Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 45 (1978) (citing 
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727–28); see also infra note 27. 
 20. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. 
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jurisdiction over defendants who personally receive service of process in 
the forum state.21  It also permitted jurisdiction over nonresidents sued by 
state citizens to determine the status of the citizens towards a 
nonresident,22 over nonresident business associations making contracts 
enforceable in the state, and over corporations created by the law of the 
state.23 
Pennoyer adopted a form of substantive due process reasoning that 
later fell out of favor.  Though the Court expressed particular concern 
with the dangers of fraud that could result from the cross-jurisdictional 
enforcement of default judgments without notice,24 it had already limited 
such abuses by holding that sister states need not give full faith and 
credit to judgments rendered without personal jurisdiction,25 and lack of 
jurisdiction was an established ground for refusing to recognize foreign- 
country judgments.26 
It is late in the day to argue that the Court wrongly decided Pennoyer 
or that due process should impose no greater restrictions on states’ 
exercise of personal jurisdiction than exist under international law.  But 
inasmuch as the Court has still not elaborated a coherent theory of 
personal jurisdiction, is not too late to acknowledge problematic aspects 
of the seminal decision,27 to reconsider the proper role of international 
                                                          
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 734. 
 23. Id. at 735.  The Court explained: 
Nor do we doubt that a State, on creating corporations or other institutions for pecuniary 
or charitable purposes, may provide a mode in which their conduct may be investigated, 
their obligations enforced, or their charters revoked, which shall require other than 
personal service upon their officers or members.  Parties becoming members of such 
corporations or institutions would hold their interest subject to the conditions prescribed 
by law. 
Id. at 735–36.  The “State” that the opinion refers to is the state of incorporation; however, the 
Court’s underlying reasoning applies with equal force to any state that recognizes the existence of 
the corporate form as a legal person.  See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 24. Id. at 728. 
 25. Id. at 729.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006), 
“appli[es] only when the court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the parties and of the 
subject-matter.”  Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729 (citing M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 
(1839)). 
 26. See STORY, supra note 19, § 586 (“In order [to recognize a foreign country judgment], it is 
indispensable to establish, that the court pronouncing [the] judgment had a lawful jurisdiction over 
the cause, and the parties.”). 
 27. Justice Hunt wrote a lengthy dissent.  The decision provided one of the four occasions on 
which wrote in dissent.  His chief objection was that the decision unnecessarily focuses on the 
timing of the attachment: 
Whether the property of such non-resident shall be seized upon attachment as the 
commencement of a suit which shall be carried into judgment and execution, upon which 
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norms and legislative authority in construing due process limits on state 
courts, and to question whether constitutional limits on personal 
jurisdiction prevent the taking of property without due process or protect 
fundamental liberty interests.28 
B. International Shoe Co. v. Washington: Minimum Contacts, Fair 
Play, and Substantial Justice 
1. The Back Story 
By the 1950s, International Shoe Co. had become the largest shoe 
business in the world.29  Incorporated in Delaware,30 its corporate offices 
occupied a ten-story structure in downtown St. Louis,31 and its extensive 
warehouse and distribution operations were housed in the sprawling 
complex of a former brewery in St. Louis.32  Absorbing other businesses 
and brands, the corporation expanded to include other manufacturing and 
retail operations across the country.33 
International Shoe Co. did not operate plants or stores in the State of 
Washington.34  But even in that remote northwest corner of the country, 
it sold enough shoes to employ eleven to thirteen full-time salesmen.35  
                                                                                                                       
it shall then be sold, or whether it shall be sold upon an execution and judgment without 
such preliminary seizure, is a matter not of constitutional power, but of municipal 
regulation only. 
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 737–38 (Hunt, J., dissenting).  Justice Hunt emphasized that the case did not 
involve a full faith and credit issue and questioned the conclusion that the Constitution required 
treating the resulting judgment as void, as opposed to erroneous.  Id. at 741, 746.  He saw the 
attachment as involving not a deprivation of individual liberty but a taking of property without due 
process.  Id. at 741. 
 28. See infra note 228. 
 29. International Shoe Co. was already the largest shoe manufacturer in the world when it 
acquired Florsheim Shoes in 1953.  See Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a 
Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 769, 796–97 (1995).  For an excellent discussion of the history of the defendant and details 
of the procedure of the litigation, see id. at 786–97. 
 30. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945). 
 31. Built originally for Roberts Shoe Company in 1910, the handsome structure, designed by 
prominent architect Theodore C. Link, received an art nouveaux face lift to inscribe the International 
Shoe corporate logo during the 1930s.  See 1501 Washington Avenue, BUILT ST. LOUIS, 
http://www.builtstlouis.net/washington/14a.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). 
 32. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313.  International Shoe Co. moved its distribution operations to 
the former brewery in 1922.  See History of the Lemp Brewery Complex, HISTORIC LEMP BREWERY, 
LLC, http://www.lempbrewery.net/history.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
 33. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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When the State of Washington sought to levy a tax on the corporation for 
contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund, the 
corporation challenged the state’s personal jurisdiction.36 
International Shoe represents the rare case where all judges in the 
courts below and all Justices on the Supreme Court agreed: 
Washington’s exercise of personal jurisdiction was constitutional.37  For 
two generations, courts had applied Pennoyer’s conceptual scheme of 
presence or consent to support personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
corporations when they engaged in business in the forum state.38  
Washington state statutes authorized “personal service [on] the employer 
if found []in the state, or, if not . . . , by mailing . . . notice to the 
employer[’s] . . . last known address.”39  Accordingly, the state achieved 
in-state service on a sales solicitor employed by International Shoe Co.,40 
and this would satisfy Pennoyer’s requirements,41 so long as the 
corporate employer engaged in a sufficient level of business in the 
state.42  International Shoe Co.’s supervision of a dozen full-time 
salesmen and the company’s shipments of trainloads of shoes to 
Washington certainly satisfied the existing level of presence required for 
personal jurisdiction.43 
What was novel was the defendant’s effort to structure its legal 
relations so as to avoid having a legal presence in the State of 
Washington.  International Shoe Co. did not authorize its agents to enter 
into contracts, collect bills, or do anything more than exhibit sample 
merchandise and forward orders to the office in St. Louis.44  The 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 311–12, 315–16. 
 37. Id. at 321. 
 38. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733, 735 (1877). 
 39. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 312. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 316 (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733) (“[The defendant’s] presence within the 
territorial jurisdiction of [the] court was [a] prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally 
binding him.”); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 42. See id. at 319. 
  It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those 
activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, 
cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative.  The test is not merely . . . whether the 
activity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its agents in another state, 
is a little more or a little less. 
Id. (citing St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 228 (1913); Int’l Harvester Co. 
of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 589 (1914)). 
 43. Id. at 320. 
 44. Id. at 314.  The Court describes the corporation’s business practices in detail.  Id.  Many of 
the practices appear to have been motivated by the goal of avoiding a sufficient presence in the state 
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soliciting agents received commission.45  Further, the corporation did not 
own any property in Washington, though it authorized its agents to rent 
both hotel rooms and sample rooms.46 
In International Shoe, Chief Justice Stone acknowledged that 
Pennoyer required the defendant to be present in the forum state’s 
territory before a judgment could be valid and “personally binding” on 
the defendant.47  He ultimately linked this requirement to the fact that 
common law actions had traditionally commenced with the judicial 
seizure of the defendant’s person through a writ of capias ad 
respondendum or similar process.48  The Chief Justice observed: 
[N]ow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal 
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only 
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be 
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum 
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”49 
Chief Justice Stone then explained that the contacts requirement 
helped avoid the circularity inherent in discussions of corporate 
presence.50  Due process requirements “may be met by such contacts of 
the corporation with the state of the forum as to make it reasonable, in  
                                                                                                                       
to support personal jurisdiction.  But there were independent business reasons for providing 
salesmen with small quantities of samples and separate legal motives for structuring sales so that 
acceptance occurred in Missouri.  Doing so assured that Missouri substantive law applied in an era 
before parties routinely included choice-of-law provisions in written agreements.  See Michael H. 
Hoffheimer, Conflicting Rules of Interpretation and Construction in Multi-Jurisdictional Disputes, 
63 RUTGERS L. REV. 599, 614–17 (2011). 
 45. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314. 
 46. Id. at 313. 
 47. Id. at 316 (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  In Milliken, the Court held that 
a state could exercise personal jurisdiction over a domiciliary so long as the substituted service 
provided a method of notice that “is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the 
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.  If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied.”  Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463 (citations omitted) 
(citing McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917)). 
 50. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17 (“To say that the corporation is so far ‘present’ there as to 
satisfy due process requirements . . . is to beg the question to be decided.  For the terms ‘present’ or 
‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state 
which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.” (citing Hutchinson v. 
Chase & Gilbert, Inc. 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930))). 
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the context of our federal system of government, to require the 
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.”51 
2. The Typology of Cases 
In determining whether corporate activity satisfied the presence 
required by Pennoyer, the Court emphasized the need to consider the 
actual burden—“inconveniences”—that the corporation would 
experience if it litigated in the forum.52  The Court then sought to 
harmonize its new approach with prior cases.  It arranged its discussion 
of prior cases under four distinct categories, each involving different 
forms of “presence” or “activity.”53 
The first category involves jurisdiction claims arising out of 
corporation’s continuous and systematic contacts in the state.  These 
cases were the easiest to decide.  The Court explained: 
‘Presence’ in the state [sufficient for personal jurisdiction] has never 
been doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only 
been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued 
on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to 
accept service of process has been given.54 
The second category involves jurisdiction based on the casual 
presence of an agent or a single isolated act unrelated to the claims in 
litigation.  This type of case was also easily decided.  The Court 
explained “that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his 
conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the 
corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject [the corporation] to suit on 
causes of action unconnected with the activities there.”55  In considering 
                                                          
 51. Id. at 317. 
 52. Id. (quoting Hutchinson, 45 F.2d at 141).  Chief Justice Stone wrote that “[a]n ‘estimate of 
the inconveniences’ which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or 
principal place of business is relevant in this connection.”  Id. (quoting Hutchinson, 45 F.2d at 141).  
From this context, it is unclear whether the Chief Justice used “or” disjunctively in this passage—
whether he meant “home” to signify the principal place of business or some place other than the 
principal place of business. 
 53. Id. at 317–18. 
 54. Id. at 317 (citing Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); St. Louis 
Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 
213 U.S. 245, 255–56 (1909); Pa. Lumberman’s Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407, 414–15 
(1905); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 610–11 (1899); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 
U.S. 350, 355 (1882)). 
 55. Id. (citing Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21 
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the burden of litigating in a forum where the corporation had only a 
casual presence or isolated contact, the Court indicated that it would not 
limit the point of reference solely to the corporation’s principal place of 
business.56  Rather, it would consider all other places where the 
corporation had more extensive contacts because “[t]o require the 
corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home 
or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has 
been thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the 
corporation to comport with due process.”57 
The third category involves jurisdiction based on continuous and 
substantial corporate activity entirely distinct from the causes of action.  
The Court conceded that it had held that “continuous activity of some 
sorts within a state” was insufficient to support jurisdiction over 
corporations in “suits unrelated to that activity.”58  But only one case 
cited was decided on constitutional grounds.59  Rather than closely 
                                                                                                                       
(1907); Cox, 106 U.S. at 359–60; Frere v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 
1943)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  The Chief Justice cited five cases where some level of continuous activity was 
insufficient to support general jurisdiction.  Four out of five cases were not decided on constitutional 
grounds.  See id. (citing Davis v. Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 317 (1923); People’s 
Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 85–86 (1918); Simon v. S. Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 
132 (1915); Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1907); Old Wayne 
Mut. Life, 204 U.S. at 21, 27).  The cases document the paucity of authority under the Due Process 
Clause for invalidating jurisdiction over corporations engaging in some level of business activity. 
Davis held that the Commerce Clause, not the Due Process Clause, prevented an exercise of 
general jurisdiction over a railroad based on activity of its in-state agent who had authority only to 
solicit out-of-state business.  Davis, 262 U.S. at 315–17.  People’s Tobacco construed a federal 
statute requiring service on a defendant who “resides or is found” in a federal district as requiring 
presence of corporate officers or agents carrying on business for the corporation.  People’s Tobacco, 
246 U.S. at 84 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)).  Simon held that a judgment creditor could be 
enjoined from enforcing a state judgment where jurisdiction was obtained by service on statutory 
agents but where the claims did not relate to the corporate defendant’s business in the state.  Simon, 
236 U.S. at 130, 132.  The Court apparently understood itself to be applying federal general equity 
principles, finding that fraud and equity supported the injunction judgment against enforcing a null 
judgment.  See id. at 122 (“United States courts, by virtue of their general equity powers, had 
jurisdiction to enjoin [a] plaintiff from enforcing a judgment” obtained by fraud and to “enjoin 
parties from enforcing [judgments] obtained without service”).  Green held as a matter of federal 
common law that the validity of jurisdiction based on personal service on a corporate agent in a 
district depended on whether the corporation was doing business in the district.  Green, 205 U.S. at 
533–34. 
 59. Only one case was decided on constitutional grounds: Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass’n held 
that the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses required reversal of an Indiana Supreme 
Court decision enforcing a Pennsylvania default judgment against an Indiana insurance corporation 
based on a policy issued to Pennsylvania residents to insure the life of a Pennsylvania resident.  Old 
Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n, 204 U.S. at 12–13, 23.  Giving conclusive effect to a standard choice of law 
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examine the facts of those cases, the Court asserted that the decisions 
nonetheless comported with the exercise of jurisdiction when the 
defendant engaged in substantial activity.60  “[T]here have been instances 
in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought 
so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against [the 
corporation] on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct 
from those activities.”61 
The fourth and final category involves claims of single occasional 
acts by a corporate agent within the state.  Sometimes these acts were 
insufficient for personal jurisdiction, but sometimes, “because of their 
nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission, [they 
were] deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit.”62 
From the opinion’s discussion of the four kinds of cases, scholars 
later constructed a typology of cases into general and specific 
jurisdiction.63  But Chief Justice Stone did not originally promulgate the 
types of cases as four exclusive categories.  Rather he treated them as 
pairs of extremes.  Thus, continuous and systematic activity giving rise 
to the claim was one extreme that supported jurisdiction, while an 
isolated contact unconnected to corporate activity in the state was the 
other extreme that clearly did not support jurisdiction.64  Falling within 
                                                                                                                       
clause stating that the policy was governed by Indiana law, the Court found both that the policy sold 
to Pennsylvania residents did not constitute doing business in Pennsylvania and that, despite 
evidence of other business activity, issuing the policy did not support personal jurisdiction relating to 
business not transacted in the state.  Id. at 21–22.  This outrageous decision may be partly explained 
by the fact that counsel for the judgment creditor never appealed or filed a brief to the Court. 
 60. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 
(1921) (per curiam); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 227 U.S. 218; Tauza v. Susqehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 
915 (N.Y. 1917)). 
 61. Id. (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry., 255 U.S. 565; St. Louis Sw. Ry., 227 U.S. 218; Tauza, 115 
N.C. 915). 
 62. Id. (citing Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); 
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916)).  In the context of this last classification, the Court 
emphasized the benefit of replacing the search for fictional or metaphorical “presence” or 
constructive “consent” by a direct evaluation of the underlying activity.  Id. at 318–19. 
True, some of the decisions holding the corporation amenable to suit have been supported 
by resort to the legal fiction that it has given its consent to service and suit, consent being 
implied from its presence in the state through the acts of its authorized agents.  But more 
realistically it may be said that those authorized acts were of such a nature as to justify 
the fiction. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 63. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136. 
 64. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (stating that personal jurisdiction cannot exist when “the 
state has no contacts, ties, or relations to the defendant,” but acknowledging the presence of personal 
jurisdiction for “obligations aris[ing] out of or [in] connect[ion] with the activities within the state”). 
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these extremes were many more difficult cases—including the single 
isolated act that sometimes did and sometimes did not support 
jurisdiction.65  The Court’s new “minimum contacts” requirement added 
little more than the appropriate label when a court decided that a case 
satisfied constitutional requirements.66 
International Shoe substituted a more flexible, policy-oriented 
analysis for the conceptualism of Pennoyer.67  The Court identified 
meaningful contacts in the state that occurred during the course of the 
defendant’s business.68  Regardless of how International Shoe Co. sought 
to structure its legal relations to avoid “presence” in a state, the important 
point was that vast numbers of its shoes were shipped into the state as a 
result of the salesmen’s in-state activities.69 
3. “Fair Play and Substantial Justice” Restrictions on Jurisdiction 
In hindsight, International Shoe authorized an expansion of the 
permissible scope of state long-arm jurisdiction by substituting a flexible 
evaluation of contacts and fairness for the “presence” previously 
required.70  At the time, however, the meaning of the Court’s decision 
was less certain.  While every member of the Court agreed that personal 
jurisdiction over International Shoe Co. was constitutional, Justice Black 
                                                          
 65. See, e.g., Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517–18 (1923) 
(providing an example of a single isolated act that did not support jurisdiction). 
 66. See generally Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 
MO. L. REV. 753, 761–70 (2003) (criticizing the minimum contacts test); Kevin C. McMunigal, 
Essay, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 
108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998) (arguing that the minimum contacts test is ambiguous and 
incoherent). 
 67. McFarland, supra note 66, at 778 (arguing that International Shoe led courts to decide 
merely whether jurisdiction was fair or unfair). 
 68. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313–14, 320. 
 69. Id. at 320. 
 70. Justice Scalia explained the history of cases after International Shoe as permitting 
deviations from traditional restrictions on personal jurisdiction “but only with respect to suits arising 
out of the absent defendant’s contacts with the State.”  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 
610 (1990) (plurality opinion) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 
408, 414 (1984)).  Twelve years after International Shoe, Justice Black wrote an opinion sustaining 
California’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a claim arising from a nonresident insurance 
company sale of one life insurance policy in the state.  McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 
(1957).  The opinion expressly referred to the judicial trend to expand the reach of personal 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 222 (“Looking back over this long history of [personal jurisdiction decisions,] a 
trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations and other nonresidents.  In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of 
our national economy . . . .”). 
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wrote separately to express concern that the new policy-oriented 
approach could restrict state power over a nonresident corporation doing 
business in the state.71  For Justice Black, a nonresident corporation 
engages in activity in a state only by grace of the state’s law, and the 
state may condition its recognition of the corporation on the 
corporation’s consent to jurisdiction in the state’s court.72  While Justice 
Black’s vision of state power lost traction over time,73 his warning that 
International Shoe’s approach could reduce as well as expand personal 
jurisdiction was prescient.74 
III. GENERAL JURISDICTION BEFORE GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES 
A. In Rem Cases After International Shoe 
In Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court had expressly approved of the exercise 
of jurisdiction in rem, a form of personal jurisdiction established by the 
judicial seizure of property at the commencement of the lawsuit.75  
                                                          
 71. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 324 (Black, J., concurring) (“I believe that the Federal Constitution 
leaves to each State, without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts,’ a power to tax and to open the doors of its courts for 
its citizens to sue corporations whose agents do business in those States.”).  Justice Black cautioned 
that the Court’s references to fairness and convenience might equally support restrictions on state 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 324–25. 
I think it a judicial deprivation to condition its exercise upon this Court’s notion of “fair 
play,” however appealing that term may be.  Nor can I stretch the meaning of due process 
so far as to authorize this Court to deprive a State of the right to afford judicial protection 
to its citizens on the ground that it would be more “convenient” for the corporation to be 
sued somewhere else. 
Id. 
 72. Id. at 323. 
 73. “[T]he old notion that a state could entirely exclude corporations or condition their entry 
upon consent to jurisdiction because corporations were state-created legal entities that could not 
operate beyond a sovereign’s borders eroded long ago.”  Brilmayer et al., supra note 12, at 759 
(footnote omitted) (citing Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1877); Bank 
of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839)).  A state may not entirely disregard the 
existence of corporations created under foreign law, but a state may apply its law and its choice-of-
law rules to determine the rights and liabilities of foreign corporations to third persons affected by 
corporate behavior in the state.  E.g., WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, 
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 91, at 288 (3d ed. 2002); KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, CONFLICT 
OF LAWS 14 (2010). 
 74. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 326 (Black, J., concurring) (“True, the State’s power is here 
upheld.  But the rule announced means that tomorrow’s judgment may strike down a State or Federal 
enactment on the ground that it does not conform to this Court’s idea of natural justice.”).  Over 
thirty years later, the Court applied the minimum contacts test to invalidate a state’s exercise of 
personal jurisdiction.  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216–17 (1977); see infra notes 79–84 and 
accompanying text. 
 75. 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877) (“[T]he State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated 
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During the twentieth century, the Court encouraged the creative 
extension of in rem jurisdiction, and it became possible for a creditor to 
obtain in rem jurisdiction by attaching a debt in any state where the 
debtor was physically present.76  Though controversial,77 the certainty 
provided by attachment and the presence of assets sufficient to satisfy a 
judgment led in rem jurisdiction to become the judicially preferred 
method for prosecuting claims against foreign corporations.78 
When the exercise of jurisdiction in rem did not arise out of or relate 
to the attached property, it supported a form of limited general 
jurisdiction.79  In 1977, the Supreme Court restricted effective general 
jurisdiction by attachment.  It held unanimously in Shaffer v. Heitner that 
actions in rem must satisfy the same constitutional requirements of 
minimum contacts and traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice that the Court imposed for in personam cases.80  This holding did 
                                                                                                                       
within its limits owned by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own citizens against 
them; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State 
where the [nonresident] owners are domiciled.”).  For good measure, the Court also endorsed the 
constitutional sufficiency of notice by constructive service by publication in such actions in rem.  Id. 
at 727. 
 76. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222–23 (1905). 
 77. Justices Harlan and Day dissented without opinion.  Id. at 228. 
 78. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 132 P.2d 70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942).  
In Perkins, California courts exercised in rem jurisdiction over a Philippine association that 
maintained a bank account in the state.  Id. at 78.  The location of assets in the state allowed the 
court to overlook the actual legal identity of the owner—treated for purposes of the litigation as a 
corporation—and to overlook whether the funds attached were related to the claims.  Id. at 76.  
Although the defendant raised many legal obstacles to paying dividends and challenged jurisdiction 
in related cases, it apparently did not consider challenging the California court’s in rem jurisdiction.  
See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438–39 (1952).  After the decision in 
California, Benguet moved its assets to Ohio and deposited them in the name of the corporation’s 
president in two banks.  Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 95 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1950) (per curiam), aff’d 98 N.E.2d 33 (Ohio 1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 437.  For further discussion, 
see infra Part III.B.1. 
 79. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136.  Such jurisdiction affects the 
defendant’s rights only up to the value of the interest in the asset seized.  See id. at 1136, 1139–40. 
When scholars state that “[t]he Supreme Court has addressed directly . . . general jurisdiction” 
on only two occasions since International Shoe, they reveal how the term “general jurisdiction” has 
become synonymous with the original idea of unlimited general jurisdiction.  See, e.g., B. Glenn 
George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1108–09 (1990). 
 80. 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (“We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court 
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its 
progeny.”).  The broadly written opinion clarifies that the same constitutional requirement applied to 
all forms of personal jurisdiction. 
Although Justice Brennan published a concurring and dissenting opinion agreeing with the 
Court’s conclusion that actions in rem must meet International Shoe’s requirement of minimum 
contacts, he disagreed with the Court’s conclusion that such contacts were not established.  Id. at 
220–21, 227–28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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not alter the reach of in rem jurisdiction when the legal claims related to 
attached property,81 but it meant that so-called quasi in rem jurisdiction 
was no longer permissible when the defendant had no ties in the state and 
when the claims in litigation were unrelated to the property that had been 
seized to secure jurisdiction.82  In other words, Shaffer restricted the 
permissible scope of quasi in rem jurisdiction to the scope of specific 
jurisdiction.83  Further consequences of Shaffer’s holding have been 
questioned.84 
                                                          
 81. See id. at 207 (majority opinion) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 56 intro. note (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, “[t]he presence of property 
may also favor jurisdiction in cases, such as suits for injury suffered on the land of an absentee 
owner, where the defendant’s ownership of the property is conceded but the cause of action is 
otherwise related to rights and duties growing out of that ownership.”  Id. at 208. 
 82. Id. at 208–09 (“For the type of quasi in rem action typified by [Shaffer], however, accepting 
the proposed analysis would result in significant change. . . . [T]he presence of the property alone 
[absent minimum contacts] would not support the State’s jurisdiction.”). 
 83. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136 (noting that “affiliations between the 
forum and underlying controversy normally support” specific jurisdiction).  The Court applied 
Shaffer to invalidate the emerging practice of attaching a tortfeasor’s insurance policy by serving the 
insurer at its place of business, a device that effectively allowed jurisdiction in many states where the 
tortfeasor had no presence or contacts.  Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327–28, 332–33 (1980).  For 
a discussion of quasi in rem cases in the context of general jurisdiction, see Brilmayer et al., supra 
note 12, at 760–62.  Silberman argues that the connection between a state and a defendant doing 
business in the state in cases like Rush satisfied modern theories of jurisdiction better than the 
attachment theory of jurisdiction.  Silberman, supra note 19, at 50–51 & n.79.  Other scholars 
observed that the Court never satisfactorily explained why such quasi in rem actions deserved 
different treatment from direct actions.  RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS § 4.29, at 286 (6th ed. 2010). 
While Rush clarified the relatedness requirement for specific jurisdiction, 444 U.S. at 328–29, 
traditional quasi in rem jurisdiction did not arise from disputes between insurer and insured.  Quasi 
in rem jurisdiction of this type was first found in Selder v. Roth, 216 N.E.2d 312, 314–15 (N.Y. 
1966), abrogated by Rush, 444 U.S. 320.  The court required the insurer to defend in New York “not 
because a debt owing by it to the defendant ha[d] been attached but because by its policy it ha[d] 
agreed to defend in any place where jurisdiction [was] obtained against its insured.”  Id. at 315.  
Accordingly, this form of jurisdiction would not have been presumptively constitutional under 
Justice Scalia’s approach in Burnham.  See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) 
(plurality opinion) (“The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone 
constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define 
the due process standard . . . .”). 
 84. Justice Stevens concurred because application of the decision in other contexts was “not 
entirely clear.”  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Justice Powell concurred but 
implicitly disagreed that limited general jurisdiction based on “property whose situs is . . . located 
within a State may, without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a defendant to 
jurisdiction within the State.”  Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Burnham, 495 U.S. at 
621–22 (limiting Shaffer’s holding to quasi in rem cases and observing that traditional forms of 
personal jurisdiction are presumptively constitutional).  But see id. at 629–30 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212) (reaffirming Shaffer’s statement that all forms of 
jurisdiction must satisfy contemporary notions of due process under International Shoe). 
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B. In Personam General Jurisdiction Cases After International Shoe 
1. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 
The Supreme Court’s only decision after International Shoe that 
permitted the exercise of unlimited general jurisdiction over a 
corporation is Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.85  The 
unusual facts of the case have produced lingering uncertainty as to its 
legal significance. 
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. operated gold and silver mines in 
the Philippines.86  During World War II, the corporation ceased its 
mining operations.87  The corporation’s president—“who was also [its] 
general manager and principal stockholder”—returned to his hometown 
in Ohio where he maintained an office, conducted business for the 
corporation, and kept corporate records.88  The president deposited 
company funds in Ohio banks, designated an Ohio bank as transfer agent 
for the corporation’s stock,89 and paid his own salary and the salaries of 
two Ohio-based secretaries.90  From Ohio, he disbursed funds and later 
supervised the reconstruction of the foreign mining facilities.91  The 
president organized directors’ meetings in Ohio both at his home and 
office.92 
As Justice Burton summarized, the corporation had carried on in 
Ohio “a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general 
business.”93  The action in personam was commenced by service on the 
corporation’s president, an Ohio resident, while engaged in such business 
                                                          
 85. 342 U.S. 437¸ 444–45 (1952). 
 86. Id. at 439. 
 87. Justice Burton, writing for the Court, assumed that the Japanese halted the mining 
operations.  Id. at 447.  The state court found only that the corporation’s surface operations were 
completely destroyed; it did not explain how or by whom.  Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 
95 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950), aff’d, 98 N.E.2d 33 (Ohio 1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 437.  Of 
Benguet’s five directors, three suffered internment by the Japanese, and one was killed.  Id. 
 88. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48.  The president had a long connection with Clermont County, 
Ohio, where he had a farm and a personal office at the bank.  Perkins, 95 N.E.2d at 7. 
 89. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448. 
 90. Perkins, 95 N.E.2d at 8.  The corporation’s funds were moved from California to Ohio 
where they were held by the president in his own name.  Id. at 8.  The president paid himself a salary 
of $12,000 for the year 1945 from the corporate funds that he controlled.  Id. at 7. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  While some directors’ meetings were held in Ohio during the war, most were held in 
locations in the United States outside of Ohio.  See id. (noting meetings in Ohio, Washington, New 
York, and San Francisco).   
 93. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438.  
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in the state.94  The Court found that the president “carried on in Ohio a 
continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime 
activities of the company” and concluded that due process did not 
prohibit Ohio courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims unrelated to 
the activity.95 
Perkins presented extreme facts.  While the corporation’s real 
property, its mines, remained in the Philippines, the president moved all 
of its other assets and most, but not all,96 of the corporate activity to 
Ohio.97  Nevertheless, the corporation did not reincorporate in Ohio or 
formally establish a principal place of business there; nor did it appoint 
an agent for service of process in Ohio.98  In addition to the magnitude of 
corporate activity in Ohio, other consideration supported jurisdiction.  
The causes of action were related to corporate activity in the state.99  The 
mining company was a foreign corporation100 but had attributes of a 
                                                          
 94. Id. at 448.  It is not clear when service occurred, but it must have happened before early 
1948 when the president, at age 80, returned to the Philippines to rebuild the company.  See Mining: 
Return of the King, TIME MAG., Mar. 8, 1948, at 96 (reporting on the president’s return to the 
Philippines), available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,853309,00.html.  The 
Ohio appellate court decision affirming trial court orders quashing service was published January 27, 
1950.  Perkins, 95 N.E.2d at 5, 12. 
Though surface facilities at the mines were destroyed during the war, the corporation began to 
restore facilities in 1946, purchasing “machinery, supplies and equipment” from funds disbursed 
from the Ohio accounts.  Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).  By late 1948, the corporation 
employed over 3,000 employees in the Philippines.  William R. Sears, A Good Judge of Gold, 
ROTARIAN, Jan. 1949, at 25, 25. 
 95. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448.  Chief Justice Vinson joined Justice Minton’s dissent.  Id. at 449 
(Minton, J., dissenting).  Under Ohio law, the state supreme court’s syllabus states the law applicable 
to the case.  Id.  The Ohio Supreme Court’s syllabus, unlike the accompanying opinion, did not 
identify the Due Process Clause as the ground for the refusal to accept jurisdiction.  Perkins v. 
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 98 N.E.2d 33, 34 (Ohio 1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 347.  The two 
dissenting Justices concluded that the syllabus left an adequate state law basis for the decision 
below.  Perkins, 342 U.S. at 449–50 (Minton, J., dissenting). 
 96. “Two or three, out of nine, [directors’] meetings . . . were held at [the president’s] home” in 
Ohio; the others occurred outside of the state.  Perkins, 95 N.E.2d at 8 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 97. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48. 
 98. Perkins, 95 N.E.2d at 6–8.  The corporation’s president may have deliberately sought to 
avoid having the corporation become subject to personal jurisdiction in any state.  See supra notes 
78 and 90. 
 99. The plaintiff sought unpaid dividends and damages resulting from the failure to issue stock 
certificates.  Perkins, 342 U.S. at 439.  Although traditionally viewed as a case involving general 
jurisdiction, one could argue that Ohio could have exercised specific jurisdiction.  See Borchers, 
supra note 18, at 124 (positing that the corporation’s Ohio activity was sufficiently related to the 
claims in the case). 
 100. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 439.  The Supreme Court treated Benguet as a corporation because it 
concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court had so held.  Id. at 439 & n.2.  The Ohio Supreme Court 
apparently held that the company was a corporation for purposes of litigation, including state service 
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partnership under which the president might incur individual liability for 
corporate debts, making him an appropriate person to receive service.101 
The Court later described its holding as “permitting general 
jurisdiction where defendant’s contacts with the forum were ‘continuous 
and systematic.’”102  Yet in later opinions, the Court reasoned that 
jurisdiction had been proper because Ohio was the corporation’s de facto 
principal place of business.103 
2. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall 
In the wake of Perkins, state courts began to exercise general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations with “substantial” activity or 
“continuous and systematic” business contacts in the state.  The Supreme 
Court of Texas found that a Colombian corporation providing helicopter 
transportation services in Peru satisfied this level of activity based on 
purchases in Texas and was thus subject to general jurisdiction for claims 
completely unrelated to its business in the state.104 
In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, the Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of the Texas Supreme Court.105  Writing for 
the majority, Justice Blackmun summarized the defendant’s contacts 
with Texas: (1) Helicol’s chief executive officer negotiated the contract 
                                                                                                                       
requirements, but it expressly stated that such recognition did not limit shareholder liability.  
Perkins, 98 N.E.2d at 37–38. 
 101. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 439–40 (allowing for service of process on the president of the 
corporation). 
 102. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984) (quoting Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448). 
 103. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011); 
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984).  Professor Mary Twitchell discusses the 
different views that emerged surrounding the relationship of Perkins to the Court’s general 
requirement in International Shoe of minimum contacts and fair play.  Mary Twitchell, The Myth of 
General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 626 n.75 (1988). 
 104. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870, 873–74 (Tex. 1982), 
rev’d, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).  The plaintiffs’ decedents were killed in a helicopter accident in Peru 
while working for a joint venture based in Texas.  Id. at 870–71.  The joint venture had contracted 
with the defendant, a Colombian corporation commonly known as Helicol, to provide transportation.  
Id. at 871.  The claim was not against the Texas employer but against Helicol, which owned and 
operated the helicopter.  Id. at 870. 
Dissenting members of the Texas Supreme Court partially anticipated the doctrine announced 
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires.  First, they asserted that the substantial and continuous activity required 
for general jurisdiction requires “some close substantial connection with the state approaching the 
relationship between the state and its own residents.”  Id. at 882–83 (Pope, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted) (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438, 445, 448).  Second, they emphasized that factors relevant 
for a finding of specific jurisdiction are immaterial to a finding of general jurisdiction, which 
requires a level of substantial and continuous activity.  Id. 
 105. 466 U.S. at 419. 
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with the decedents’ Texas employer to provide transportation services in 
South America; (2) Helicol purchased approximately eighty percent of 
its helicopters and related equipment from Bell Helicopter Company, a 
manufacturer in Fort Worth, Texas; (3) Helicol sent pilots to Texas for 
training; (4) Helicol’s management and maintenance personnel visited 
Bell Helicopter’s factory in Texas; and (5) Helicol received payments 
from funds held in a Texas bank.106  Justice Blackmun observed that 
Helicol was not authorized to do business in Texas and never had an 
agent there for service of process; it performed no helicopter operations 
in the state and sold no product that reached the state; it solicited no 
business in Texas, signed no contracts there, had no employees based 
there, and recruited no employees in the state; it owned no property, 
maintained no office, and kept no records in the state; and it had no 
shareholders in the state of Texas.107 
In the Court’s first explicit distinction between specific and general 
jurisdiction, Justice Blackmun contrasted specific jurisdiction—for 
which the “‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation’ is the essential foundation”108—and general jurisdiction—
which requires “sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign 
corporation.”109  The Court then turned to the issue of whether Helicol’s 
contacts with Texas “constitute the kind of continuous and systematic 
general business contacts the Court found . . . in Perkins.”110 
Dismissing the significance of most of Helicol’s activity in Texas, 
the Court concluded that the temporary presence of the chief executive 
officer was not continuous and systematic and that the location of the 
bank from which payments were made was irrelevant.111  The Supreme 
Court of Texas found that Helicol’s purchase of over four million dollars 
worth of equipment and the regular training of pilots constituted 
sufficient contacts.112  The Supreme Court disagreed: “[W]e hold that 
                                                          
 106. Id. at 410–11.  The parties conceded that the claims did not arise out of or relate to the 
defendant’s activities in Texas.  Id. at 415. 
 107. Id. at 411. 
 108. Id. at 414 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). 
 109. Id. (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779–80 (1984)). 
 110. Id. at 416. 
 111. Id. at 416–17. 
 112. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870, 871–72 (Tex. 1982) 
rev’d, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).  The Texas court pointed to an additional fact that the Supreme Court 
did not discuss—the defendant maintained a permanent employee presence “in Texas on a year-
round rotation basis.”  Id. at 871. 
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mere purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to 
warrant a State’s assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident 
corporation in a cause of action not related to those purchase 
transactions.”113 
Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court signaled a commitment to 
the analytic distinction between specific and general jurisdiction and 
made clear that general jurisdiction required a much higher level of 
corporate activity than specific jurisdiction.114  It borrowed from Perkins 
the label of “continuous and systematic” contacts for such activity.115  
The opinion helpfully explained that “mere purchases,” occurring on a 
regular basis, training, and other visits failed to create sufficiently 
continuous and systematic contacts to support general jurisdiction.116  
But it did not explain what other activity, such as regular sales or 
maintaining some permanent physical presence in the forum, might be 
enough.117 
IV. GENERAL JURISDICTION IN GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES 
A. Case History 
Julian Brown and Matthew Helms, thirteen-year-old boys residing in 
North Carolina, died from injuries they received during a trip to France 
when the bus on which they were riding rolled over.118  Administrators of 
the children’s estates commenced a wrongful death action in North 
Carolina state court, alleging that a defective tire manufactured by 
Goodyear Turkey caused the rollover.119  The action named as 
                                                          
 113. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418.  Similarly, the Court viewed the regular training of pilots as 
incidental to the purchases and thus insignificant.  Id.  The Court relied in part on pre-International 
Shoe authority that “purchases and related trips” are not sufficient for general jurisdiction.  Id. at 417 
(citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923)). 
 114. Id. at 413–18. 
 115. Id. at 416 (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952)). 
 116. Id. at 418. 
 117. The confusing state of the law is evident in the briefing and arguments in Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires.  The petitioners asked the Court to decide on narrow grounds that the North Carolina courts 
lacked general jurisdiction based on the lack of direct sales and lack of permanent physical presence 
by corporate agents.  Brief for Petitioners at 12, 21, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 10–11. 
 118. Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 385 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 119. Id. at 384.  Plaintiffs’ theory was that plies on the tire separated.  Id. 
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defendants Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear USA)120 and 
three affiliated European corporations, Goodyear France, Goodyear 
Luxembourg, and Goodyear Turkey.121  After limited discovery, the trial 
court denied the foreign defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.122 
The state appellate court affirmed.123  The applicable long-arm 
statute124 authorized personal jurisdiction so long as it did not violate the 
Constitution.125  Because the wrongful death claims did not arise out of 
or relate to the defendants contacts in North Carolina,126 the appellate 
court recognized that general personal jurisdiction required a finding that 
the defendants’ maintained sufficiently continuous and systematic 
activities in North Carolina to support the exercise of general personal 
jurisdiction.127 
                                                          
 120. Id. at 384 n.1.  The state court opinion did not explain the presence of Goodyear USA, 
except to observe that Goodyear USA did not challenge the North Carolina court’s jurisdiction.  See 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2850 (noting also that Goodyear USA operates plants in North 
Carolina and “regularly engaged in commercial activity there”).  Goodyear USA is an Ohio 
corporation qualified to do business in North Carolina where it appointed an agent to receive service 
of process.  Id.; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 4.  When asked about the basis for 
jurisdiction, corporate counsel explained that Goodyear USA consented to jurisdiction.  Transcript of 
Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 4. 
 121. Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 384 n.1.  One party’s name changed during litigation.  This Article 
refers to the affiliated corporations by the names employed in the Supreme Court opinion.  Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2851–52. 
 122. Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 385, 387.  The trial court found it had jurisdiction based on the 
defendants’ “continuous and systematic ties with the State” and concluded that the “[e]xercise of 
general jurisdiction over the defendants . . . d[id] not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
justice.”  Id. at 387. 
Most of the trial court’s fact finding was uncontested on appeal.  See id. at 392.  The appellate 
court concluded that two findings of fact were not supported.  These related to the conclusion that 
the foreign corporations “caused” tires to be shipped into North Carolina.  Id.  The appellate court 
also observed that whether the defendant companies had continuous and systematic contacts or 
conducted substantial activity in North Carolina were questions of law and not findings of fact.  Id. 
 123. Id. at 395. 
 124. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-75.4 (2007). 
 125. See Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 387 (“‘When personal jurisdiction is alleged to exist pursuant to 
the long-arm statute, the question of statutory authority collapses into one inquiry[,]’ which is 
whether defendant has the ‘minimum contacts necessary to meet the requirements of due process.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Filmar Racing, Inc. v. Stewart, 541 S.E.2d 733, 736 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2001))). 
 126. Id. at 388. 
 127. Id.  Because all parties conceded that the contacts were unrelated to the claims, id., the case 
did not provide the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide how closely litigation must be 
related to the defendant’s contacts to establish specific jurisdiction.  See generally Brilmayer et al., 
supra note 12, at 738 (discussing the uncertainty surrounding how closely the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum must relate to the claims in order to support specific jurisdiction and proposing a 
“test of substantive relevance” under which specific jurisdiction would exist when the jurisdictional 
 
HOFFHEIMER FINAL 4/19/2012  2:00 PM 
2012] GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION AFTER GOODYEAR 571 
The court found systematic and continuous contacts based on the 
corporations’ engaging in international business with unlimited 
geographical scope.128  The fact that an allegedly defective tire was 
marked for sale in the United States persuaded the court that “the 
manufacturer contemplated that the tire might be sold in this country.”129  
Further, from 2004 to 2007, North Carolina received shipments of at 
least 33,923 tires manufactured by Goodyear France, 6,402 tires 
manufactured by Goodyear Luxembourg, and 4,059 tires manufactured 
by Goodyear Turkey.130  The court found that the sales resulted from 
marketing coordination among the defendants, which supported the trial 
court’s determination that shipment of the foreign manufacturers’ tires 
into the state was “‘a continuous and systematic’ process rather than 
sporadic or episodic one.”131 
In addition to finding sufficient contacts, the state appellate court 
considered whether exercise of jurisdiction was fair.132  It found that the 
plaintiffs had an interest in litigating in their home state133 and that North 
Carolina had an interest in providing a forum.134  It further recognized 
that while the exercise of jurisdiction imposed a burden on the foreign 
defendants, the defendants’ close ties with domestic defendants reduced  
                                                                                                                       
contacts form part of the statement of plaintiff’s claim in a well-pleaded complaint. 
 128. See Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 394 (“Defendants have . . . purposefully and intentionally 
manufactured tires and placed them in the stream of interstate commerce without any limitation on 
the extent to which those tires could be sold in North Carolina.”). 
 129. Id. at 393. 
 130. Id. at 393–94.  The total numbers did not include tires attached to cars that were delivered 
into the state.  Id. at 394. 
 131. See id. at 394–95 (“[T]he trial court’s findings reflect that thousands of [Defendant’s tires] 
were distributed in North Carolina as a result of a highly organized distribution process that involved 
Defendants and other Goodyear affiliates.”).  Goodyear coordinated international sales and 
marketing by developing business plans and sales plans.  Id. at 386 n.4.  “After [determining specific 
market needs], the needed tires would be manufactured, shipped to the United States, and distributed 
to retailers and similar entities using Goodyear’s existing distribution system.”  Id. 
 132. See id. at 394–96. 
 133. See id. (“[R]equiring Plaintiffs, who have no ties to France, to litigate their claims in the 
French courts would impose a considerable burden on them.”). 
 134. See id. (“North Carolina has a well-recognized interest in providing a forum in which its 
citizens are able to seek redress for injuries that they have sustained . . . .”). 
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this burden.135  In contrast, the plaintiffs would face a greater burden if 
the court refused to exercise jurisdiction.136 
In affirming the lower court’s decision, the appellate court 
specifically addressed the defendants’ argument that stream of commerce 
does not support general jurisdiction.137  The court observed that delivery 
of a limited quantity of products might not support general 
jurisdiction.138  But the court found the opposite to be the case: 
[T]hat is not the situation present here.  Instead, the trial court’s 
findings reflect that thousands of tires manufactured by each of the 
Defendants were distributed in North Carolina as the result of a highly 
organized distribution process that involved Defendants and other 
Goodyear affiliates.  Thus, [there was] sufficient basis . . . to support a 
finding of general personal jurisdiction . . . .139 
B. Justice Ginsburg’s Rejection of Hybrid Jurisdiction 
In reversing, Justice Ginsburg wrote a broad opinion for the 
unanimous Court to provide greater clarity for practitioners and lower 
courts.140  She insisted on the need to distinguish “general or all-purpose 
                                                          
 135. See id. (“Although there is no question but that requiring Defendants to defend an action in 
[North Carolina] would be burdensome as well, that burden is alleviated to some extent by the fact 
that Defendants have corporate affiliates in the United States with business interests in North 
Carolina . . . .”).  The trial court had found that the foreign defendants were not inconvenienced, in 
part, because they were represented by the same attorneys who were representing the U.S. 
corporations.  Id. at 387. 
 136. See id. at 394 (“[A] greater burden would be imposed upon [the] Plaintiffs in the event that 
they [would have been] required to litigate their claims in France compared to the burden that would 
be imposed upon Defendants in the event that they [would have been] required to defend [in North 
Carolina].”). 
 137. Id. at 394–95. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 395. 
 140. The opinion decided much more than the question presented by the corporate defendants of 
“[w]hether a foreign corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction . . . merely because other 
entities distribute in the forum state products initially placed in the stream of commerce by the 
corporation.”  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 117, at i.  The Court refused the corporate defendants’ 
invitation to base its decision on the narrow presence-in-the-forum requirement, which would turn 
on the presence of some property or authorized agent within the forum state.  Id. at 14, 21.  The 
Court also ignored the pre-International Shoe authority that the corporate defendants proposed as a 
narrow basis for the decision.  Id. at 7, 23–24 (citing Consol. Textile v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 88 
(1933)).  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 5, 10–11 (“[I]n particular . . . just as the 
Rosenberg case was binding in Helicopteros on the point that mere purchases are not enough for 
general jurisdiction, here, Consolidated Textile v. Gregory is binding on the flip side of that, which 
is that mere sales in the State are not enough for general jurisdiction.” (italics added)). 
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jurisdiction” from “specific or case-linked jurisdiction,”141 excluding any 
intermediary class or hybrid category of jurisdiction.142  She sought to 
clarify the level of activity required for general personal jurisdiction: a 
state may exercise general personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations 
“when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ 
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”143 
Because the deaths in France resulted from conduct unrelated to 
North Carolina, the state could not exercise specific personal 
jurisdiction.144  The Court also found that the corporate activity was 
insufficient to support general personal jurisdiction: 
Some of the tires made abroad by Goodyear’s foreign subsidiaries . . . 
had reached North Carolina through “the stream of commerce”; that 
connection, the Court of Appeals believed, gave North Carolina courts 
the handle needed for the exercise of general jurisdiction over the 
foreign corporations. 
 A connection so limited between the forum and the foreign 
corporation . . . is an inadequate basis for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction.  Such a connection does not establish the “continuous and 
systematic” affiliation necessary to empower North Carolina courts to 
entertain claims unrelated to the foreign corporation’s contacts with the 
State.145 
C. The Narrow Reading: Extending the Holding in Helicopteros from 
Purchases to Sporadic Sales 
For a Court committed to a categorical differentiation between 
general and specific jurisdiction, Goodyear Dunlop Tires presented an 
easy case.  Some corporate activity, even if continuous and located 
                                                          
 141. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. 
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984)). 
 142. Justice Brennan favored a form of hybrid jurisdictional analysis in his Helicopteros dissent.  
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 427–28 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 143. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 317 (1945)).  In contrast to general jurisdiction, the Court asserted that a state may exercise 
specific jurisdiction based “on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ 
principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject 
to the State’s regulation.”  Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra 
note 3, at 1136). 
 144. Id.  The state appellate court acknowledged the lack of specific jurisdiction.  See supra 
notes 126–27. 
 145. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 394–95 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), 
rev’d sub nom. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011)). 
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within a state, does not support personal jurisdiction over claims 
unrelated to the activity.146  Justice Ginsburg consulted the Court’s two 
general jurisdiction decisions after International Shoe for guidance.147 
She characterized the defendant’s activity in Perkins as tantamount 
to establishing a purely in-state business in Ohio.148 She quoted with 
approval the Court’s prior characterization that “Ohio was the 
corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business.”149  Although a 
business centered in the forum state provided the paradigm for general 
jurisdiction,150 Justice Ginsburg did not limit general jurisdiction to a 
corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place of business.  
Instead, she relied on the holding in Helicopteros that a regular course of 
purchases were insufficient to support general jurisdiction and 
announced: “We see no reason to differentiate from the ties to Texas held 
insufficient in Helicopteros, the sales of petitioners’ tires sporadically 
made in North Carolina through intermediaries.”151  To the Court, the 
sales in Goodyear Dunlop Tires failed to establish systematic and 
continuous contacts.  The foreign affiliates were “in no sense at home in 
North Carolina.  Their attenuated connections to the State fall far short 
of . . . ‘the continuous and systematic general business contacts’ 
necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on 
claims unrelated to anything that connects them to the State.”152 
                                                          
 146. Id. at 2856.  “A corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state,’ 
International Shoe instructed, ‘is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable 
to suits unrelated to that activity.’”  Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318). 
 147. See generally id. at 2856–57 (discussing the Perkins and Helicopteros decisions). 
 148. See id. at 2856 (“To the extent that the company was conducting any business during and 
immediately after the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, it was doing so in Ohio: the 
corporation’s president maintained his office there, kept the company files in that office, and 
supervised from the Ohio office ‘the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company.’” 
(quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952))). 
 149. Id. (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779–80 n.11) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 150. The Court referred to Perkins as “[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction.”  Id. (alteration 
in original) (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151. Id.  The Court’s reference to intermediaries is important to the narrow framing of its 
decision, but the record is unclear.  Counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the foreign 
manufacturers completed direct shipments of products from the factory to buyers that Goodyear 
USA had identified in North Carolina.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 36–37.  
Plaintiffs’ counsel relied on the web of connections between the corporations to establish sufficient 
contacts.  See id. at 36–37, 39–40 (describing Goodyear USA’s various distribution schemes and 
arguing that the forum should have general jurisdiction over such a “tightly controlled system”). 
 152. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citations omitted) (quoting Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)). 
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1. Characterizing the Facts 
The opinion’s characterization of the facts supports a narrow reading 
of the opinion.  To find that the record established no more than 
“sales . . . sporadically made in [state] through intermediaries,”153 the 
Court minimized the volume of the defendants’ in-state sales by 
comparing them to the higher volume of sales elsewhere.154  Justice 
Ginsburg also minimized the foreign defendants’ regular dealings with 
Goodyear USA and emphasized the role of intermediaries.155 
The finding of sporadic sales156 flows from an observation that a 
relatively small proportion of the international manufacturers’ products 
appear in the forum market.157  As the Court observed: 
They have no place of business, employees, or bank accounts in North 
Carolina.  They do not design, manufacture, or advertise their products 
in North Carolina.  And they do not solicit business in North Carolina 
or themselves sell or ship tires to North Carolina customers.  Even so, a 
small percentage of [defendants’] tires (tens of thousands out of tens of 
millions manufactured between 2004 and 2007) were distributed within 
North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates.158 
To minimize the regularity of the distribution, the opinion added that the 
imported tires were custom-ordered for special purposes159 and did not 
include the type of tire that allegedly caused the deaths in France.160 
The opinion omits details about the volume of sales and does not 
address the economic significance of the North Carolina sales to the 
overall business of the foreign manufacturers.  Instead, it declares the 
                                                          
 153. Id. at 2856. 
 154. See id. at 2852 (finding that “a small percentage of [defendants’] tires . . . were distributed 
within North Carolina” and noting that the defendants “manufacture tires primarily for sale in 
European and Asian markets”). 
 155. Id. at 2856–57.  The plaintiffs insisted that the record did not support this, and they argued 
that shipments were made directly to purchasers identified by Goodyear USA and directly to 
Goodyear USA in North Carolina.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 36–37; see also 
supra note 130 and accompanying text (calculating the total volume of tires shipped from defendants 
to Goodyear USA from 2004 to 2007). 
 156. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2856. 
 157. See id. at 2852. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 30–31 (“The Goodyear 
Regional RHS tire . . . was not generally designed for the U.S. market, although it was brought [to 
the United States] under special circumstances.”). 
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volume small by comparison.161  This comparative evaluation of business 
contacts for purposes of general jurisdiction parallels the Court’s 
treatment of contacts for purposes of legislative jurisdiction,162 but it 
departs from the analysis proposed by leading scholars whose work the 
opinion cites elsewhere with approval.163  The comparative approach 
reaches an appropriate result in situations where fundamental unfairness 
counsels against subjecting a foreign corporation to either adjudicatory 
or legislative jurisdiction.  But the approach’s conclusion that the volume 
of sales is insufficient makes it unclear whether the same volume of sales 
would suffice if the foreign corporation engaged in less extensive 
international business.164 
                                                          
 161. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2852. 
 162. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814–15, 819, 823 (1985) (holding that due 
process prohibited application of Kansas interest rate to substantive claims where “over 99% of gas 
leases and some 97% of plaintiffs” had “no apparent connection to the State of Kansas” 
notwithstanding the presence of hundreds of Kansas plaintiffs in the class and property in-state 
related to claims). 
 163. The Court cites the work of Brilmayer and her coauthors multiple times in its opinion.  See, 
e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 2854 (citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 12, at 728, 
782).  But in the work cited, Brilmayer and her coauthors write: 
We should not treat defendants as less amenable to suit merely because they carry on 
more substantial business in other states . . . .  Thus, the due process clause should permit 
general jurisdiction on the basis of activities when the defendant reaches the quantum of 
local activity in which a purely local company typically would engage. 
Brilmayer et al., supra note 12, at 742.  Another scholar has proposed that “requisite minimum 
contacts supporting general jurisdiction exist when the nonresident defendant is engaging in 
continuous activities in the forum similar in nature and volume to the in-state activities of an 
enterprise domiciled or based in the forum.”  Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General 
Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 811 (2004).  To prevent any misunderstanding, Brilmayer 
and her coauthors emphasize that, “for purposes of general jurisdiction, the relevant issue is the 
absolute amount of activity, not the amount of activity relative to what the defendant does outside 
the state.”  Brilmayer et al., supra note 12, at 743.  In contrast, they also propose that a court should 
evaluate a nonresident defendant’s contacts based on property by comparing them to the proportion 
of the defendant’s total assets.  Id. at 770–71. 
While focusing on the local quantum of activity, Brilmayer and her coauthors insist on the 
need to differentiate interstate and in-state activity.  Id. at 743–48.  Because of the burden placed on 
interstate commerce by the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction, id. at 745–46, they propose that 
“courts should weigh a defendant’s intrastate contacts more heavily and should discount purely 
interstate activity in determining whether to exercise general jurisdiction.”  Id. at 747.  
“Exercising . . . jurisdiction [based on a defendant’s sporadic sales in the forum state] ignores the 
discriminatory and burdensome impact on interstate trade that results when interstate contacts are the 
sole basis for general jurisdiction.”  See id. at 748 (citing Quaker Oats Co. v. Chelsea Indus., Inc., 
496 F. Supp. 85, 88 (N.D. Ill. 1980)).  Based on this analysis, the holding in Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
might be correct because of the wholly interstate character of the foreign affiliates’ contacts, but not 
because the foreign affiliates had insufficient local contacts compared to their far greater level of 
activity out of state. 
 164. For example, a Turkish corporation might engage exclusively in one activity—
manufacturing custom tires for the North Carolina market.  It would be hard to characterize 
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2. Rejecting Forum State Interests in Evaluating the Sufficiency of 
Contacts for General Jurisdiction 
The Court’s attention to the proportion of sales rather than their total 
volume may conceal an implicit concern with the fairness of the forum.  
Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion makes clear that neither considerations 
of fairness to the parties nor the strength of the forum state’s interest 
supports a finding of general jurisdiction in the absence of continuous 
and systematic activity by the defendant.165  The Court briefly comments 
in a footnote that both a plaintiff’s relationship to a forum and the forum 
state’s interest based on the residence of the plaintiff are entirely 
irrelevant for purposes of evaluating general jurisdiction.166 
The effect of the Court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ and forum state’s 
interests on the analysis of general jurisdiction remains uncertain because 
the opinion does not set forth the overall analysis required for a finding 
of general jurisdiction.167  At a minimum, the Court appears committed 
                                                                                                                       
thousands of annual sales by such a corporation as “sporadic,” even though the volume of sales 
might not rise to the level of Goodyear Turkey’s sales of tires distributed in North Carolina.  There 
are good reasons for permitting general jurisdiction over the hypothetical Turkish corporation.  See 
ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 52 (4th ed. 1986) (arguing that general 
jurisdiction should be permitted over a corporation that conducts “substantial activities over a period 
of time” in a particular state).  But the “comparative volume of sales” discussion in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires leaves open the question of whether North Carolina would have jurisdiction over the 
hypothetical company, and the opinion contains dictum that suggests jurisdiction would not exist.  
See infra Part IV.E.1. 
 165. Justice Ginsburg acknowledges that, “[a]s further support, the court invoked North 
Carolina’s ‘interest in providing a forum in which its citizens are able to seek redress for [their] 
injuries,’ and noted the hardship North Carolina plaintiffs would experience ‘[were they] required to 
litigate their claims in France.’”  Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2853 (alterations in original).  
The Court’s discussion implies that the state court had employed fairness factors to support its 
finding of sufficient contacts.  On the contrary, the state court found contacts based on the 
defendants’ continuous and systematic sales and then considered the burden on the plaintiff, the 
burden on the defendant, and the state interest in providing a forum.  See supra notes 131–36 and 
accompanying text. 
The Court’s opinion did not consider the actual burden on the defendant.  This is in keeping 
with the Court’s holdings that lack of inconvenience does not support personal jurisdiction in the 
absence of a constitutionally sufficient relationship between the defendant and the forum.  See, e.g., 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (“However minimal the burden of defending in a 
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the ‘minimal 
contacts’ with that State . . . .” (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945))). 
 166. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 n.5 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction to adjudicate has in 
[United States] practice never been based on the plaintiff’s relationship to the forum.” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1137) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 167. The Court may have avoided doing so because it was unnecessary to its decision or because 
there was no agreement as to the proper analysis for general jurisdiction.  See infra notes 228–37 and 
accompanying text. 
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to the position, announced in previous decisions, that the absence of any 
burden on the defendant will not permit general jurisdiction without 
sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.168  Justice 
Ginsburg seems, however, to assert more forcefully that the sufficiency 
of contacts for purposes of general jurisdiction is an independent inquiry 
and that neither the plaintiff’s interests nor the forum’s interests may 
discount the required level of activity.169  In other words, Justice 
Ginsburg appears to reject, at least for general jurisdiction, Justice 
Brennan’s view that the interests of the plaintiff and forum state 
“sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a 
lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be 
required.”170 
3. Disregarding Business Affiliations Short of a Common Enterprise 
Where the North Carolina courts found systematic coordination of 
marketing, manufacturing, and distribution among the foreign 
corporations and Goodyear USA,171 the Court’s opinion characterizes the 
                                                          
 168. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). 
[T]he Due Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a 
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state 
has no contacts, ties, or relations.”  Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no 
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if 
the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the 
forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting 
as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its 
power to render a valid judgment. 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319) (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251). 
 169. Justice Ginsburg expressly limited the rejection of fairness considerations to general 
jurisdiction and contrasted this to their role in determining specific personal jurisdiction.  Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 n.5 (“When a defendant’s act outside the forum causes injury in the 
forum, by contrast, a plaintiff’s residence in the forum may strengthen the case for the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction.” (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984); von Mehren & Troutman, 
supra note 3, at 1137)). 
It remains uncertain, however, whether Justice Ginsburg views the fairness of exercising 
personal jurisdiction as a consideration that reduces the requirement for other contacts or whether 
she views it as an independent consideration that may strengthen the case for specific jurisdiction 
after constitutional minimal contacts have been established.   
 170. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (citing Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984); Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–89; McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 
355 U.S. 220, 223–24 (1957)). 
 171. Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 386 n.4, 394 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d sub nom. 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).  The North Carolina 
appellate court found that the tires reached the state as a consequence of a “highly-organized 
distribution process.”  Id. at 394. 
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facts as showing only that “some” tires manufactured abroad by 
subsidiaries of Goodyear USA reached the forum state.172  The opinion 
emphasizes both the foreign manufacturers’ behavior that occurred 
outside the United States173 and their lack of property, agents, and sales 
activity in state.174 
The Court omits any discussion of the web of corporate relationships 
that resulted in the daily delivery of thousands of tires into North 
Carolina.175  This and its failure to discuss the actual relations among the 
Goodyear affiliates prevent a clear understanding of how broadly the 
holding applies. In dictum, the opinion suggests the possibility that the 
state court might exercise general jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers 
that form part of a “single enterprise” with other entities over which the 
                                                          
 172. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (citing Meter, 681 S.E.2d at 394–95) 
(describing tens of thousands of tires as “[s]ome” tires).  The state appellate court’s opinion nowhere 
established that the foreign affiliates were subsidiaries, while Justice Ginsburg, who elsewhere refers 
to them as “indirect subsidiaries,” id. at 2852, neither explains the corporate relationship between the 
defendants nor identifies the place in the record that indicates the relationship.  The descriptive label 
may derive from the petitioners’ corporate disclosure statement.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 
117, at iii (listing defendants as “indirect subsidiaries” in the corporate disclosure statement). 
The state appellate court focused on the coordination of marketing and manufacturing through 
which Goodyear USA communicated product needs to foreign affiliates who then manufactured the 
products for distribution through Goodyear USA in North Carolina and other markets.  See Meter, 
681 S.E.2d at 393–94 (finding that the manufacture and distribution of the tires into interstate 
commerce, not excluding North Carolina, was sufficient to establish general jurisdiction). 
 173. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2852 (noting that the foreign affiliates 
“manufacture tires primarily for sale in European and Asian markets,” which “differ in size and 
construction from tires ordinarily sold in the United States”).  The opinion supports the inference, 
however, that the United States was a secondary market for special order tires for heavier vehicles.  
See id. (noting that most tires distributed in North Carolina were “custom ordered to equip 
specialized vehicles”). 
 174. Id. (discussing the problematic claim that defendants neither sold in state nor “themselves” 
shipped tires into the state); see supra note 151.  Justice Ginsburg’s rhetoric disengages the 
defendants from active agency in the forum.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2852 
(“[Defendants’] tires . . . were distributed . . . by . . . affiliates.”).  The paragraph discussing the facts 
supporting personal jurisdiction consists of three sentences describing activity in which the foreign 
affiliates have not engaged.  Id.  These are followed by two sentences in the passive voice explaining 
that the tires “were distributed” and “were . . . custom ordered.”  Id. 
 175. Instead, the Court dismissed the “belatedly assert[ed] . . . ‘single enterprise’ theory” 
argument urged by the plaintiffs.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (noting that because 
the theory was not addressed in the plaintiffs’ brief, the Court would “not address it”).  Justice Scalia 
suggested during argument that an opinion that failed to address jurisdiction based on enterprise 
liability would be of limited use to the bar: 
We haven’t resolved a whole lot if we leave that question [of enterprise liability] open, 
have we?  You want us to write an opinion that says unless you—unless you ignore the 
separate corporate existence of the subsidiary—(a question on which we express no 
opinion) there can be no jurisdiction in cases like this?  Is that the kind of an opinion that 
the world is waiting for? 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 8. 
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state court could exercise general jurisdiction.176  To show such a single 
enterprise, the Court suggests, would require piercing Goodyear’s 
corporate veil for jurisdictional purposes,177 but the posture of the case 
prevented the Court from reaching the issue.178 
The Court’s treatment of the single enterprise theory offers future 
plaintiffs one possible strategy for establishing general jurisdiction while 
simultaneously signaling that it will be difficult to establish jurisdiction 
under such a theory.  The Court assumes, if only for the sake of 
argument, that the total contacts of the corporations with North Carolina 
would suffice to create general jurisdiction if a court attributed the 
activity to a single corporation.179  But the Court’s insistence that the 
corporate contacts be evaluated separately makes clear that due process 
requires states to respect the separate existence of foreign corporations in 
the absence of circumstances that warrant piercing the corporate veil.180 
The opinion leaves no doubt that indirect sporadic sales through 
intermediaries, by themselves, never establish general jurisdiction.181  It 
does not explain what additional relationships—if any—among the 
business entities responsible for the manufacturing and sale of products 
in a state would suffice. 
                                                          
 176. The Court cited an article describing the requirements for “merging [a] parent and 
subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes.”  Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing Lea 
Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: 
Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14, 29–30 (1986)).  Even the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals, however, considered the defendants to be “separate corporate entities . . . 
not directly responsible for the presence in North Carolina of tires that they had manufactured.”  
Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 392. 
 177. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 176, at 
14, 29–30). 
 178. The Court refused to reach the issue because plaintiffs had not raised it at trial, on appeal, or 
in their brief to the Court.  Id. 
 179. It is not certain that the total contacts would establish that the single enterprise is “at home” 
in the state.  See infra Part IV.D.3. 
 180. The Court’s discussion was limited to enterprise liability on piercing the corporate veil.  See 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2857.  It did not separately consider an alternative theory 
under which corporations, while retaining their distinct legal identity, may form a joint venture that 
results in the attribution of one corporation’s acts to the other for purposes of both liability and 
jurisdiction.  Cf. UNIFORM P’SHIP ACT of 1997 §§ 101(10), 202(a), 5 U.L.A. 61, 92 (2001) 
(providing that partnerships arise when persons, including corporations, carry on as co-owners a 
business for profit). 
 181. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2856. 
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4. Limiting the Holding to Corporations 
In other cases, some members of the Court have expressed doubt 
about whether state courts may exercise general jurisdiction over an 
individual based on a high level of contacts.182 The opinion in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires offers no clues as to the Court’s current view.  The opinion 
addresses activity that subjects corporations to general jurisdiction but 
has no direct application to individuals.  Thus, it sheds no light on the 
question of whether state courts may exercise general jurisdiction over 
individuals who engage in systematic and continuous business activity in 
a state.183 
Justice Ginsburg traces “continuous and systematic contacts” to 
decisions involving corporate activity.184  She does not, however, explain 
whether such contacts establish the means for determining the 
corporation’s principal place of business, furnish an alternative basis for 
jurisdiction when corporations engage in sufficient activity, or establish 
an independent threshold for “minimum contacts” that applies equally to 
corporations and individuals. 
D. The Broad Reading: Restricting General Jurisdiction over 
Corporations to States of Incorporation and Principal Places of 
Business 
Although the opinion’s characterization of the record supports a 
narrow reading that disallows general jurisdiction based on sporadic 
sales through intermediaries, the opinion itself provides grounds for a far 
broader reading.  Under this broader reading, the Court disfavors general 
jurisdiction over corporations and restricts such jurisdiction to those 
                                                          
 182. Four members of the Court have questioned whether a court may exercise such “‘contacts’-
based [general] jurisdiction” over individuals but declined to express a view on the matter.  See 
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 n.1 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
 183. As a practical matter, contacts-based general jurisdiction will only be necessary for an 
individual who is neither domiciled in a state nor physically present so as to be amenable to personal 
service.  Cf. id. at 627–28 (holding that a state may exercise general jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendant personally served in the state); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 464 (1940) (holding that 
a state may exercise general jurisdiction over a person domiciled in the state). 
 184. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2853 (discussing International Shoe and 
Helicopteros).  The opinion notes that “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of 
general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.”  The opinion then describes the paradigm forum 
for general jurisdiction by analogy to the individual’s domicile, noting that “it is an equivalent place, 
one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”  Id. at 2853–54 (citing Brilmayer et al., 
supra note 12, at 728). 
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states in which corporations were traditionally subject to general 
jurisdiction—the state of incorporation and the principal place of 
business.185 
1. Extending the Opinion Beyond Corporations from a Foreign Country 
The Court frames the issue: “Are foreign subsidiaries of a United 
States parent corporation amenable to suit in state court on claims 
unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum State?”186  But 
the opinion makes clear that the holding is not limited to corporation 
from foreign countries.187  None of the Court’s reasoning invokes the 
special status of the defendants as existing under the laws of foreign 
countries as opposed to sister states.188  And the Court’s own references 
to “foreign corporations” include all non-domestic corporations.189  The 
foreign manufacturers could not constitutionally face general jurisdiction 
in North Carolina because they were not “at home” in North Carolina 
due to a lack of continuous and systematic business contacts; their 
international legal status did not affect the analysis.190 
2. Disfavoring General Jurisdiction over Corporations 
The Court’s exclusive classification of cases into specific and 
general jurisdiction is consistent with prior decisions.191  The Court 
breaks new ground, however, with the announcement that the continuous 
and systematic affiliations required for general jurisdiction must be 
tantamount to establishing a legal home.192 
                                                          
 185. The broadest possible reading approaches the position advocated for in the Brief of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at 3–4, Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (No. 10-76) (arguing that general jurisdiction 
over a corporation is limited to place of incorporation and place of “systematic supervision of 
corporate activities,” which is comparable to the level of the defendant’s in-state activity in Perkins). 
 186. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2850. 
 187. Id. at 2851 (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-
country) corporations . . . .”). 
 188. See id. at 2856–57. 
 189. See id. at 2851. 
 190. See id. at 2857. 
 191. See supra Part II.B; see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2853 (observing that 
International Shoe and Helicopteros recognized categories of specific and general jurisdiction). 
 192. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.  The continuous and systematic affiliations 
must “render them essentially at home in the forum State.”  Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).  International Shoe does not employ the phrase “at home.”  For a 
discussion on how to define “at home,” see infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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The restriction of general jurisdiction over a corporation to a place 
where it is “at home” is troubling.  A court could traditionally exercise 
general jurisdiction over individuals based on multiple grounds—
domicile or habitual residence, presence, or consent.193  Justice Ginsburg 
privileges domicile as the archetypal form of general jurisdiction over an 
individual by proposing that a state in which a corporation is “at home” 
should similarly have authority to exercise general jurisdiction over the 
entity.194  Jurisdiction based on domicile is an established historical 
practice, yet reasons supporting the practice remain obscure.195 
The phrase “at home” is a neologism lacking any fixed legal 
meaning.196  While an individual may feel “at home” in many places, 
natural persons have traditionally had one and only one legal home—
their domicile.197  For individuals, the law assigns this legal home at 
                                                          
 193. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1137. 
 194. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 12, at 
728). 
 195. Von Mehren and Trautman contended that general jurisdiction based on the individual’s 
domicile arose from the need for one “certain and predictable place” for litigation.  Von Mehren and 
Trautman, supra note 3, at 1137.  This is not entirely convincing.  The authors neither explained why 
certainty should provide an adequate basis for jurisdiction nor considered the fact that a person’s 
domicile can be uncertain. 
In contrast, Brilmayer and her coauthors sought to justify domicile-based jurisdiction by 
grounding it in the power of domiciliaries to influence forum law and by their receipt of reciprocal 
benefits.  Brilmayer et al., supra note 12, at 733.  This explanation fails, however, to explain why 
defendants are subject to general jurisdiction where they cannot vote.  Rhodes similarly argues that 
the “reciprocal benefits or exchange theory” best explains general jurisdiction based on domicile.  
See Rhodes, supra note 163, at 911, 913. 
Instrumental explanations that justify the burden of jurisdiction by reference to the benefits a 
corporation receives from the state of incorporation or principal place of business are subject to 
Justice Scalia’s critique of instrumental justifications for general jurisdiction based on personal 
service.  See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 623 (1990) (plurality opinion) (observing 
that benefits a transient visitor experiences in the forum state seem inadequate to make it fair for the 
state to enter an enforceable judgment disposing of all of the defendant’s assets). 
 196. Counsel for petitioners apparently first injected the “at home” formula into the case.  See 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54.  While Chief Justice Stone assumed that general 
jurisdiction would be proper at a corporation’s “home” in International Shoe, he placed his first use 
of the term in ironic quotation marks.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317; see supra note 52 and 
accompanying text.  It is unclear whether he meant the term as a loose synonym for principal place 
of business.  See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (using both the terms “home” and “principal place of 
business”).  Justice Stone contrasted physical presence in the state, which establishes jurisdiction, 
with casual presence or single isolated activities unconnected with the claims and performed by an 
agent in a place other than where the corporation has its “home or other jurisdiction where it carries 
on more substantial activities.”  Id. 
 197. Domicile is a Latin cognate of “home.”  Definitions for domicile in turn sometimes invoke 
references to “home” or place of abode.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 11 (1971) (“Domicil is a place, usually a person’s home . . . .”). 
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birth198 and recognizes it unless and until an individual establishes a new 
domicile.199 
A corporation’s domicile is more uncertain.  Although some archaic 
authorities defined a corporation’s domicile as its place of 
incorporation,200 more recent authorities reject the terminology of 
domicile in relationship to corporations.201  There are good reasons why 
courts and legal authorities avoid assigning domicile or legal homes to 
corporations.  The traditional tests for domicile focus on presence and 
subjective intent and do not apply to corporations.  Moreover, for most 
purposes, the law recognizes that a corporation may have significant 
legal relationships with more than one state. 
Justice Ginsburg leaves little doubt that cases in which the Court 
relaxed constitutional limits on specific personal jurisdiction must not be 
read to indicate a similar commitment to relaxing limits on general 
jurisdiction.202  On the contrary, sharply distinguishing specific and 
general jurisdiction, she criticizes the North Carolina courts for 
confusing acts relevant for specific jurisdiction and those necessary for 
general jurisdiction.203  Justice Ginsburg looks to only three cases for 
understanding due process limits on general jurisdiction.  She 
characterizes International Shoe as limiting general jurisdiction to a 
corporation’s home,204 reads Perkins as analogizing the term “home” to a 
corporation’s principal place of business,205 and construes Helicopteros  
 
                                                          
 198. Id. § 14. 
 199. The test for establishing domicile is physical presence coupled with the intent to remain 
indefinitely.  Id. § 15–16, 18. 
 200. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (1934) (“A corporation is domiciled in the state 
where it was incorporated, and cannot acquire a domicil outside that state.”).  The Restatement cited 
no authority for this doctrine, and its attempt to ascribe domicile to a corporation reflected the 
theoretical goal of ascribing a fixed state identity to corporations for the purpose of applying various 
choice-of-law rules that depended on domicile.  See id.; see also JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41.1 (1935).  The principal author of the Restatement acknowledged 
criticism of the idea of corporate domicile; he defended it, without citing any authority, as a doctrine 
that provided convenience in applying the formal conflicts rules.  BEALE, supra, § 41.1. 
 201. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (restricting domicile to 
natural persons).  Though there is scant authority for the notion of corporate domicile, at least one 
statute refers to it.  See 36 U.S.C. § 30901(b) (2006) (fixing the domicile of the Boy Scouts of 
America Corporation in the District of Columbia). 
 202. Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2855 (2011). 
 203. See id. (“The North Carolina court’s stream-of-commerce analysis elided the essential 
difference between case-specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction.”) 
 204. Id. at 2851 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). 
 205. Id. at 2857 (comparing defendants to those in Perkins and finding that they “are in no sense 
at home in North Carolina”). 
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as refusing to extend general jurisdiction to a corporation that engages in 
“mere purchases” and training of employees in the forum state.206 
3. Reducing General Jurisdiction to Place of Incorporation and 
Principal Place of Business 
The Court’s opinion identifies two places where a corporation will 
be “at home” and, thus, subject to general jurisdiction: the place of 
incorporation and the principal place of business.207  The opinion does 
not expressly prohibit other states from exercising general jurisdiction.  
In discussing caselaw, however, Justice Ginsburg emphasizes that in the 
only case in which continuous and systematic contacts permitted a 
finding of general jurisdiction, the corporation maintained its principal 
place of business in the forum state.208  Moreover, her opinion’s 
rhetorical restriction of general jurisdiction to a corporation’s home 
suggests that “continuous and systematic” corporate activity must be 
comparable to a principal place of business.209 
Restricting unlimited general jurisdiction to a corporation’s place of 
incorporation or principal place of business implements reforms 
proposed by legal scholars cited by Justice Ginsburg,210 but it stands in 
                                                          
 206. Id. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 
(1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 207. Id. at 2853–54 (citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 12, at 728). 
 208. Id. at 2856 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952)); 
see supra notes 102–03 and 149 and accompanying text.  In fact, the corporate defendant may have 
resumed mining operations in the Philippines by the time the plaintiff commenced the action in 
Ohio.  See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1144. 
 209. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2856–57 (noting that in Perkins, the corporation 
had its de facto principal place of business in the forum state and that the defendants in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires were, unlike the defendant in Perkins, not at home).  Four Justices are not eager to 
permit general jurisdiction outside the corporation’s place of incorporation and principal place of 
business.  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.  Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion) 
(“Citizenship or domicile—or, by analogy, incorporation or principal place of business for 
corporations—also indicates general submission to a State’s powers.” (citing Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2854)). 
 210. Brilmayer and her coauthors advocated general jurisdiction based only on “unique 
affiliations,” like place of incorporation and principal place of business.  Brilmayer et al., supra note 
12, at 735.  Other scholars have opined that “absent the kind of total, close, and continuing relations 
to a community implied in incorporation or in the location of a head office within a state, jurisdiction 
over legal persons . . . should take the form of specific jurisdiction.”  See von Mehren & Trautman, 
supra note 3, at 1139–44.  Von Mehren and Trautman inaccurately predicted the decline of other 
forms of general jurisdiction and anticipated the Court’s decision when they characterized Perkins as 
“approving the forum utilized as a surrogate for the place of incorporation or head office.”  Id. at 
1144.  Twitchell proposed restricting general jurisdiction to the corporation’s “home base,” which 
she defined for corporations as the state where they are headquartered, but also argued that courts 
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tension with the analysis proposed by other scholars whom she also cites 
with approval.211  For Brilmayer and her coauthors, the essential 
difference between general and specific jurisdiction lies in the number of 
contacts.212  These authors propose that a corporation may be subject to 
general personal jurisdiction in three different types of forums—the 
place of incorporation, the principal place of business, and a place where 
the corporation has a sufficient “absolute quantum of activity.”213  
Accordingly, the authors argue that multiple additional states could 
exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant that carried on continuous 
and systematic activities in those states.214 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion provides no detailed explanation for why 
the facts did not amount to the continuous and systematic activity 
required for general jurisdiction.215  On the one hand, it emphasizes that 
the quantity of sales and efforts to serve a market in a forum—facts 
relevant for specific jurisdiction—do not constitute continuous and 
                                                                                                                       
should recognize jurisdiction in the state of incorporation.  Twitchell, supra note 103, at 669–70. 
 211. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 2853–54. 
 212. Brilmayer and her coauthors explain: 
What difference does it make whether we characterize assertion of state judicial power as 
specific or general?  Differentiating between the two is crucial for one important reason: 
fewer contacts—perhaps only one—will support specific jurisdiction.  In contrast, the 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Perkins and Helicopteros suggest that assertions of general 
jurisdiction require a larger number of contacts. 
Brilmayer et al., supra note 12, at 727 (footnotes omitted) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 
(1957); Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447). 
 213. Id. at 734.  Brilmayer and her coauthors observe that states may define the principal place of 
business differently, but the authors do not explain why a state’s definition should affect the due 
process limits on the state’s exercise of judicial power.  Id. at 734–35. 
 214. See id. at 734–35 (acknowledging the “other bases, such as activities, presence, property, 
and consent” have been used to establish general jurisdiction). 
For Brilmayer and her coauthors, additional states could exercise general jurisdiction but not 
necessarily apply their substantive law.  See id. at 726, 780 (contending that only states with unique 
affiliations such as place of incorporation and principal place of business have legislative 
jurisdiction).  The authors observed: 
A substantial quantity of unrelated activities also may satisfy these rationales [for 
adjudicatory jurisdiction] . . . . To the extent that defending in one’s domicile is 
convenient, litigating where one carries on continuous and systematic activities is also 
likely to be convenient. . . . [A] test that focuses on continuous and systematic activities 
eliminates the uncertainty of proving which of several places is the defendant’s principal 
place of business.  Most importantly, the reciprocal benefits rationale obtains when the 
defendant carries out substantial activities, which implicate the police powers and public 
facilities of the state. 
Id. at 741. 
 215. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2854–58 (analyzing the general jurisdiction 
argument but providing little guidance). 
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systematic activity.216  On the other hand, the opinion concludes that the 
total amount of foreign affiliates’ contacts showed that the defendants 
“are in no sense at home in North Carolina” and “fall far short of” the 
required continuous and systematic business contacts.217 
The restriction of general jurisdiction to one or two states would 
effect a radical shift.  Under established practice, states may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporations engaged in business 
in the state for certain lawsuits.218  In Pennoyer, the Court expressly 
recognized such jurisdiction for lawsuits “instituted with respect to” 
related business activity in the state.219  While Pennoyer authorized 
specific jurisdiction, the Court in International Shoe observed that due 
process prohibited general jurisdiction over corporations when corporate 
ties arose from “the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his 
conduct of single or isolated” acts unrelated to the claim.220  The Court 
explained that “[t]o require the corporation in such circumstances to 
defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdiction where it carries 
on more substantial activities has been thought to lay too great and 
unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due 
process.”221  Nothing in the traditional line of cases discussing corporate 
presence for purposes of either specific or general jurisdiction suggests 
that the tests for presence were aimed at restricting corporate presence to 
one or two states.222  Nor did the corporate defendants in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires ask for such a windfall.223 
                                                          
 216. Id. at 2855 (“[T]ies serving to bolster the exercise of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a 
determination that, based on those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.” (citing 
Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distribs. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 203 n.5 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (Ginsburg, J.))). 
 217. Id. at 2857 (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416). 
 218. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735 (1877). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). 
 221. Id. (emphasis added). 
 222. For example, the Court in International Shoe defines “presence” as merely “activities of the 
corporation’s agent within the state,” but the Court never specifies the number of states in which 
such activity may occur.  Id. at 316–17. 
 223. Petitioners’ counsel employed the formula “at home” in oral argument.  See Transcript of 
Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 4–5 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction is about suing . . . the corporation 
essentially where [it is] located or at home.  [It is] always fair to bring a suit against the corporation 
there.”).  Petitioners’ counsel, however, refrained from proposing being “at home” as the exclusive 
standard for general jurisdiction, arguing instead that the case was easily decided on existing 
authority.  Id. at 5 (mentioning Helicopteros as one such authority). 
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4. Eliminating Fair Play and Substantial Justice Considerations 
In specific jurisdiction cases prior to 2011, the Court had 
distinguished the evaluation of minimum contacts creating a sufficient 
affiliation between the defendant and the forum state from the evaluation 
of additional factors that could make the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
fundamentally unfair or unreasonable.224  In such cases, the Court 
employed a two-part analysis that considered (1) minimum contacts and 
(2) fair play and substantial justice.225  In some cases, the presence of 
facts making the exercise of jurisdiction fundamentally unfair and 
unreasonable allowed courts to find that personal jurisdiction was 
unconstitutional without determining whether minimum contacts were 
present.226  For example, the Supreme Court in Asahi, considered five 
factors concluding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was so unfair 
or unreasonable as to violate due process: (1) “the burden on the 
defendant,” (2) “the interests of the forum State,” (3) “the plaintiff’s 
interest in obtaining relief,” (4) the interest of the interstate or 
international judicial system in efficiently resolving controversies, and 
(5) the shared substantive policies of different states.227 
There is reason to question whether the Court remains committed to 
this two-part analysis even for specific personal jurisdiction cases.228  It 
                                                          
 224. See generally Brilmayer et al., supra note 12, at 735–43 (discussing different contacts that 
establish general or specific jurisdiction and explaining how those contacts influence considerations 
of fairness and justice). 
 225. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 226. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–16 (1987).  
Although the Justices disagreed on whether minimum contacts existed, eight members of the Court 
agreed that the exercise of jurisdiction offended traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.  See id. at 116. 
 227. Id. at 113 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) 
(listing the five factors for the first time)). 
 228. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Nicastro emphasizes the need for in-state activity that is 
directly attributable to the defendant and repudiates the independent value of fairness considerations 
to support jurisdiction.  See 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion) (“Freeform notions of 
fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered in the 
absence of authority into law . . . . [T]hose who live or operate primarily outside a State have a due 
process right not to be subjected to judgment in its courts as a general matter.”). 
Criticizing the opinions in Asahi for being imprecise, Justice Kennedy makes clear that “[t]he 
principal inquiry in cases [such as Nicastro] is whether the defendant’s activities manifest an 
intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”  Id. at 2788.  Notably absent is any discussion of 
the actual basis on which the Court decided Asahi, which indicates that Justice Kennedy no longer 
finds the two-part analysis helpful.  See id. at 2789 (stating that “a rule based on general notions of 
fairness and foreseeability . . . is inconsistent with the premises or lawful judicial power”). 
Justice Alito joined Justice Breyer’s concurrence, and they concluded that “a single isolated 
sale” did not establish the necessary minimum contact.  Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Their 
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was never entirely clear whether analysis of general jurisdiction required 
a similar two-part consideration of contacts and fairness.229  Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion in Goodyear Dunlop Tires suggests that few, if any, 
situations require a two-part analysis when evaluating general 
jurisdiction.230 
First, the high threshold required to establish general jurisdiction will 
obviate the concerns that led the Court to consider separately whether 
                                                                                                                       
position is consistent with the approach in Justice Stevens’ opinion in Asahi where he suggested 
tentatively that the quantity of products distributed in the state satisfied minimum contacts.  Asahi, 
480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 229. The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue.  Lower courts and legal commentators 
were divided.  Some thought that general jurisdiction based on systematic and continuous contacts 
operated like physical presence and dispensed with the need for evaluating fair play.  See, e.g., 
Robert L. Theriot, Note, Specific and General Jurisdiction—The Reshuffling of Minimum Contacts 
Analysis, 59 TUL. L. REV. 826, 838–39 (1985) (“The threshold inquiry—whether the defendant’s 
contacts are continuous and systematic—has become determinative of the ultimate inquiry—whether 
the exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.  In this regard, the Court’s treatment of general 
jurisdiction differs remarkably from its treatment of specific jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)).  Other 
scholars thought that continuous and systematic contacts satisfied only the minimum contacts 
requirement and suggested that courts must further evaluate the fairness factors.  See Walter W. 
Heiser, Toward Reasonable Limitations on the Exercise of General Jurisdiction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1035, 1042 & n.26 (2004) (identifying lower court decisions that apply the factors to general 
jurisdiction cases and opining that “concerns about whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable 
and fair should actually be heightened in general jurisdiction cases” (citing George, supra note 79, at 
1129–41; Mary Twitchell, Why Do We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 196–97); Rhodes, supra note 163, at 899–90 (opining that courts should 
examine fair play factors when finding general jurisdiction). 
Given the uncertainty, one cautious authority counsels a consideration of both substantial 
contacts and fairness.  See MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: EXAMPLES AND 
EXPLANATIONS 44 (2010). 
Scholarly proposals often assumed the appropriateness of the two-part analysis.  See, e.g., 
George, supra note 79, at 1129 (proposing a two-part test for general jurisdiction over corporate 
defendants that considers (1) the “presence of a corporate office within the” State to establish 
minimum contacts and (2) whether jurisdiction is reasonable by considering “the size and functions 
of the office” in light of “fair play factors”); Rhodes, supra note 163, at 919 (summarizing a 
proposed three-prong test for finding general jurisdiction with the first two prongs designed to 
evaluate minimum contacts based on substantial activity in the forum state and the third prong 
designed to evaluate notions of fair play and substantial justice).  George additionally argues that 
“[o]nce the minimum contacts threshold is met, as with specific jurisdiction, the fair play factors 
may serve to affirm the appropriateness of jurisdiction or illustrate its unreasonableness.”  George, 
supra note 79, at 1131. 
 230. Justice Ginsburg does not mention a two-part test anywhere in her discussion of general 
jurisdiction.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854–57 
(2011).  Justice Ginsburg also cites Asahi only for the proposition that introducing a defective 
product into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it enter the forum state is insufficient 
to support specific jurisdiction because such conduct does not establish minimum contacts with the 
forum.  Id. at 2854 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105).  She does not refer to the two-part test used by 
the Court in Asahi, see id., notwithstanding the fact that the corporations in Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
invited such analysis.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 117, at 51. 
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jurisdiction is fundamentally fair or reasonable.231  Requiring continuous 
and systematic contacts comparable to the defendants’ legal home 
assures that such states will have real interests in providing forums, and 
it protects corporate defendants from the burden of litigating in seriously 
inconvenient places.232  Second, the Court’s emphasis on the nexus 
between the defendant and the forum state,233 coupled with the absence 
of any hint that courts should consider fundamental fairness factors,234 
indicates that the Court considers the forum state’s interest and the 
plaintiffs’ interest as irrelevant to the determination of general 
jurisdiction.235 
In any event, the Court explains that such factors never permit the 
exercise of general jurisdiction outside of a place with which the 
defendant has continuous and systematic contacts comparable to its place 
of incorporation or principal place of business.236  Thus, the only possible 
surviving use of factors such as the plaintiffs’ and forum’s interests 
would be to eliminate jurisdiction in a case where, despite the presence 
of systematic and continuous contacts, other considerations militate 
against jurisdiction.237 
E. The Middle Path 
Between the narrow and broad readings of the opinion in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires lies a third option.  On the one hand, courts should apply 
the holding to a range of cases that do not fall within the Court’s narrow 
                                                          
 231. See Theriot, supra note 229, at 838–39. 
 232. See Heiser, supra note 229, at 1042–43 (stating that avoiding inconvenience and burdens on 
defendants’ is the “primary concern in assessing the ‘reasonableness’ of personal jurisdiction”). 
 233. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (requiring a “continuous and systematic” 
affiliation). 
 234. See supra Part IV.D.4. 
 235. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 236. The Court definitively rejects the proposal advanced by some authors that weaker contacts 
may be strengthened by the presence of factors making general jurisdiction reasonable.  See 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2855 (stating that factors supporting specific jurisdiction do 
not warrant a finding of general jurisdiction).  Cf. Heiser, supra note 229, at 1049 (discussing 
sliding-scale tests used by lower courts). 
 237. Such a case would arise if a North Carolina court subjected a corporation like Goodyear 
USA to general jurisdiction in North Carolina based solely on its manufacturing and marketing 
activity in the state, even though the claims involved a defective product manufactured and marketed 
outside North Carolina, which caused injury outside the state.  The Constitution might prohibit 
personal jurisdiction over such a civil action if neither the forum state nor the plaintiff had legitimate 
interests in litigating in a North Carolina forum, especially if North Carolina’s exercise of 
jurisdiction interfered with the authority of other sovereigns with an interest in the dispute. 
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framing of the issue but that cannot be meaningfully distinguished from 
the facts of the case.238  On the other hand, courts should avoid applying 
the opinion’s broad doctrinal language to situations that differ 
significantly from the facts presented in Goodyear Dunlop Tires. 
1. The Court Did Not Expressly Limit the Decision to Sporadic Sales of 
Manufacturers’ Products Through Intermediaries 
The narrowest possible reading of the opinion is not a fair reading of 
the decision.  On the contrary, the Court understood that its decision 
approved of and added to jurisprudence that allowed general jurisdiction 
at a corporation’s sole place of business239 and that prohibited general 
jurisdiction based on purchases and related physical corporate presence 
in the state.240  Justice Ginsburg meant for the opinion to explain the 
common ground of these decisions. 
Although the opinion framed issues narrowly, nothing in the Court’s 
reasoning limits its scope to foreign manufacturers or even to buyers and 
sellers.  The decision would thus apply with equal force to business 
entities that acquire products after the initial manufacturing and to out-
of-state businesses that provide services in the forum state.  Despite the 
Court’s characterization of the facts to emphasize the sporadic nature of 
the sales and the role of intermediaries,241 it is questionable whether a 
fair reading of the opinion limits the holding to such circumstances.  
Given the Court’s lack of attention to the role of intermediaries,242 the 
opinion strongly suggests that even limited quantities of direct sales by 
themselves will not establish general jurisdiction over a foreign corporate 
vendor.243 
                                                          
 238. Read most narrowly, the decision leaves unanswered most questions about general 
jurisdiction, such as whether a state may exercise general jurisdiction over a manufacturer that sells a 
large volume of products in the forum state or targets its sales through in-state subsidiaries.  Cf. 
Friedrich Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 158 
(identifying similar questions that were unanswered by the Court’s jurisprudence as of 2001). 
 239. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 151–52. 
 241. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2856. 
 242. See id. at 2850, 2856 (using the term “intermediaries” only once). 
 243. Dictum in a footnote drops all qualifications that the holding applies only to sporadic sales 
through intermediaries: “As already explained . . . , even regularly occurring sales of a product in a 
State do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.”  Id. at 2857 n.6.  
Despite this dictum, the Court nowhere previously opined that regular direct sales were 
constitutionally insufficient for general jurisdiction. 
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2. The Court Disfavors General Jurisdiction Based on Corporate 
Activities or Contacts at a Place Other than the Place of 
Incorporation or Principal Place of Business 
 Courts should avoid leaping to the broadest possible application of 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires and avoid reading it as eliminating general 
jurisdiction except in states where a corporation is incorporated or 
maintains its principal place of business.  The opinion itself contains 
language that suggests that there can be other states where a corporation 
has such substantial, continuous, and systematic business contacts that 
those states may constitutionally exercise general jurisdiction.244  
Nevertheless, a fair reading of the opinion leaves little doubt that 
circumstances giving rise to general jurisdiction will be unusual.  While 
the Court may not have completely eliminated general jurisdiction based 
on contacts, it makes clear that only extraordinarily high levels of 
activity may support such general jurisdiction.245 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
A. The Big Picture: General Jurisdiction in Context 
1. Expanding the Gaps and Shrinking the Gap Filler 
Plaintiffs infrequently utilize general jurisdiction theories, 
“suggesting the difficult nature of succeeding under that approach.”246  In 
some cases, however, where specific jurisdiction is not available, general 
jurisdiction provides the only form of jurisdiction.  For cases where a 
state does not authorize specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction 
                                                          
 244. See id. at 2852, 2856–57 (discussing the location and quantity of sales of defendants’ tires 
in North Carolina and emphasizing only that sporadic sales are insufficient). 
 245. See discussion supra note 244.  Prior to Goodyear Dunlop Tires, one authority warned that 
“counsel who attempts to bring a case on the theory of general jurisdiction in a forum in which the 
defendant has no obvious physical presence had best make alternative plans for pursuing the case 
elsewhere in the event that the forum concludes that it lacks jurisdiction.”  PETER HAY ET AL., 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.9, at 412 (5th ed. 2010).  This warning should now include attempts to assert 
general jurisdiction anywhere other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business. 
 246. Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1, 38 
(1998).  Professor Solimine’s empirical study found that twelve percent of cases invoked general 
jurisdiction.  Id.  Numerous decisions purporting to find general jurisdiction do so in disputes where 
in-state contacts gave rise to the litigation.  See Rhodes, supra note 163, at 820–21.  Some scholars 
even claim general jurisdiction is “rare.”  See, e.g., Twitchell, supra note 103, at 630 (contending 
that, with the rise of specific jurisdiction, “the exercise of general jurisdiction has become rare”). 
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provides a gap-filling function, allowing state courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over a broader range of cases provided that the exercise of 
general jurisdiction does not violate due process rights.247 
Justice Ginsburg, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires, endorses a theory of 
general jurisdiction proposed in the 1960s and 1970s by scholars with a 
specific reform agenda.  Seeking to rationalize and generalize the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction cases, von Mehren and Trautman had assumed that 
specific jurisdiction was expanding and would someday reach the point 
where state courts could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over all 
cases in which the state had an interest or state residents were affected.248  
Given this expansion, the authors argued that “ultimately only general 
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction should be recognized, and the only 
relationship basing general jurisdiction should . . . be [the] habitual 
residence except [when] the defendant has no substantial connection with 
any community.”249  Accordingly, they proposed eliminating in rem 
jurisdiction and jurisdiction based on in-state personal service when the 
claims did not arise out of or relate to the defendant’s activity in the 
state.”250  They also proposed—with remarkable little attention to 
caselaw251—that the gap-filling function of general jurisdiction would be 
satisfied by limiting it to one place where a defendant could always be 
forced to litigate.252  Brilmayer and her coauthors published a proposal 
that differed in details but shared the assumption that a restriction of 
general jurisdiction would not reduce the scope of state judicial power 
because of the concurrent expansion of specific jurisdiction.253 
                                                          
 247. See Borchers, supra note 18, at 130–32 (arguing that general jurisdiction fills gaps left by 
three major deficiencies in specific jurisdiction).  Because general jurisdiction provides an important 
supplement to specific jurisdiction, Borchers observes that “abolishing general jurisdiction might be 
a more palatable alternative if specific jurisdiction operated more sensibly.  But as things stand, 
abolishing general jurisdiction would make a bad situation worse.”  Id. at 132. 
 248. For example, they argued that states should have jurisdiction over cases where residents did 
not leave the state but were injured by wholly out-of-state defendant activity.  Von Mehren & 
Trautman, supra note 3, at 1167–68, 1172. 
 249. Id. at 1177. 
 250. Id. at 1164–65, 1177. 
 251. Id. at 1141–42 (citing no cases for general jurisdiction at principal place of business). 
 252. For individuals, this place was domicile or habitual residence.  Id. at 1177.  For 
corporations, scholars were less sure which place was appropriate.  Some assumed that the place of 
incorporation was valid but also recognized the principal place of business.  Id. at 1179 (proposing 
general jurisdiction at the place of corporate headquarters and defining corporate headquarters to 
include “both the place of incorporation and the principal place of business”). 
 253. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 12, at 782 (arguing that specific jurisdiction stems from a 
forum’s right to regulate in-state activities); see also Twitchell, supra note 103, at 675–76 (expressly 
linking her proposed restriction of general jurisdiction to her proposed expansion of specific 
personal jurisdiction). 
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Decades of cases have revealed that expectations of a rational 
expansion of specific personal jurisdiction were unfounded.  The Court 
has repudiated efforts to formulate a broad theory of jurisdiction based 
on reason and fairness,254 retreated from cases that authorized specific 
jurisdiction based on harm caused in the forum state,255 and inched 
towards a vision of substantive due process where a defendant must 
submit to jurisdiction through some affirmative act of will and can, 
correspondingly, structure extraterritorial activity so as to be immune to 
jurisdiction.256  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, adopting half of a theory 
proposed by reform-minded scholars over thirty years ago, does not 
produce a coherent theory of jurisdiction.  It results in a reduction of state 
jurisdiction that reformers never anticipated. 
2. Too Many Metaphors 
Rather than explaining the reasons for general jurisdiction257 Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion in Goodyear Dunlop Tires proposes a new metaphor 
                                                          
 254. See J. McIntyre Mach, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality opinion) 
(noting that “general fairness considerations [are not] the touchstone of jurisdiction”).  Justice 
Brennan’s separate opinions offer the most ambitious formulation of an approach to personal 
jurisdiction based on reasonableness and fairness.  See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419–28 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that fairness and the 
expansion and ease of conducting business warranted finding jurisdiction where the defendants 
engaged in some business in the forum); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
317–19 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that sufficient contacts and economic benefits 
would make it fair to find specific jurisdiction); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 225 (1977) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that relevant considerations include 
party expectation and fairness). 
 255. Compare World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (majority opinion) (explicitly approving 
of pure stream-of-commerce jurisdiction), with Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 
102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) (holding that placing a product into the stream of commerce does 
not establish minimum contacts), and Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (repudiating the stream-of-
commerce metaphor). 
 256. Justice Kennedy articulates the theory that substantive due process—presumably natural 
law outside the United States—guarantees a realm in which legal actors are free from the power of 
states absent some conduct by which they volitionally submit to both legislative and adjudicatory 
jurisdiction.  See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (“[T]hose who live or operate primarily outside a State 
have a due process right not to be subjected to judgment in its courts as a general matter.”)  Thus, a 
corporation is free from a state’s personal jurisdiction unless it incorporates under the laws of the 
state, maintains its principal place of business in the state, or is responsible for some conduct in the 
state that gives rise to the lawsuit.  See id. (stating that a corporation’s presence includes being 
incorporated or having its principal place of business in the forum). 
 257. There is reason to suppose the Justices could not reach agreement on the underlying 
principles that support general jurisdiction.  Cf. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (sharply criticizing the plurality’s submission theory of jurisdiction). 
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to help courts grapple with problems of general jurisdiction.258  In 
determining whether a state has general jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation, lower courts must now ascertain whether the defendant is 
incorporated in, maintains a principal place of business in, or is 
otherwise “at home” in the forum state. 
Justice Ginsburg does not propose the “at home” metaphor as a 
substitute for older metaphors of substantial activity or continuous and 
systematic contacts in the state.  The new metaphor supplements the 
older metaphors and encourages courts to apply the old metaphors in a 
more restrictive fashion.  Yet determining whether a corporation is “at 
home” will itself require an inquiry into “activity” and “contacts,” which 
are themselves metaphors that were promulgated as aids to determining 
whether a corporation had achieved sufficient “presence.” 
B. The Little Picture: The Unknown 
1. Where Is the Place of Incorporation? 
It has long been recognized that a state has general jurisdiction over 
a corporation incorporated under its law.259  The reason for this is not 
obvious, however, and Goodyear Dunlop Tires sheds no light on the 
matter.  The Court’s metaphorical reference to a corporation being “at 
home” in its place of incorporation seems merely to repeat the old view 
that a corporation’s “domicile” is its place of incorporation.260  The 
opinion’s restriction of general jurisdiction outside the place of 
incorporation will force plaintiffs to bring actions more often in the place 
of incorporation, even when that place is problematic. 
                                                          
 258. It might have been useful for the Court to consider the theories and metaphors that lower 
courts had employed in the absence of guidance from the Court, including the Ninth Circuit’s 
success with the “at home” metaphor.  See infra note 288. 
The petitioners proposed a rule that would require the Court to attribute some in-state property 
or act directly to the defendant as a necessary, but independently insufficient, ground for general 
jurisdiction.  See supra note 223. 
 259. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735–36 (1887) (“Nor do we doubt that a State, on 
creating corporations . . . may provide a mode in which their conduct may be investigated, their 
obligations enforced, or their charters revoked, which shall require other than personal service upon 
their officers or members.”); see also supra notes 200 and 256. 
 260. See supra note 184.  Cf. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (plurality opinion) (citing Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2894 (2011)) (explaining that a 
corporation’s submitting to a sovereign’s laws evidences “general submission to a State’s powers”). 
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Scholars originally proposed general jurisdiction at the place of 
incorporation as a single, easily identifiable fall-back jurisdiction.261  But 
the place of incorporation is not necessarily singular or fixed.  
Corporations need not have only one state of incorporation.262  Federal 
law may give rise to the existence of corporate entities, preventing any 
individual state from qualifying as the place of incorporation,263 and 
foreign legal systems may present similar challenges.  Businesses can 
have de facto corporate existence in one state yet be recognized as a 
partnership in another.264  And corporations change their place of 
incorporation in the midst of litigation.265 
2. Where Is the Principal Place of Business? 
Further uncertainty attends the authority and justification for the 
doctrine that a corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction in 
the state in which it maintains its principal place of business.266  Von 
                                                          
 261. See supra note 200. 
 262. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 27, at 166 (5th ed. 1994); see 
also Donald T. Weckstein, Multi-State Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship: A Field Day for 
Fictions, 31 TENN. L. REV. 195, 210 (1964). 
 263. See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 30901(a) (2006) (incorporating the Boy Scouts of America in the 
District of Columbia). 
 264. See, e.g., Paper Prods. Co. v. Doggrell, 261 S.W.2d 127, 128–29 (Tenn. 1953) 
(distinguishing recognition of a de facto corporation when a charter is not filed as a matter of 
Tennessee law from disregard of corporate existence and treatment of resulting business as 
partnership under Arkansas law). 
 265. E.g., Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 523–24 
(1928). 
 266. An early statement of a general principle appeared in 1875: “The general rule is that a 
corporation can be sued only in the place where it was created—within the jurisdiction where it was 
born, and where its principal place of business is located.”  Bawknight v. Liverpool & London & 
Globe Ins. Co., 55 Ga. 194, 195 (1875), overruled in part by Newberry v. Tenant, 121 Ga. 561 
(1904).  Moreover, at this early date, courts already understood that foreign corporations were 
subject to jurisdiction based on debts arising in state provided only that a corporate agent received 
service in the state.  Id. at 196.  Corporate assets located in the state could be seized to satisfy 
unrelated claims.  Id. at 197.  In other words, courts recognized broad forms of specific jurisdiction 
and quasi in rem general jurisdiction.  In contrast, under the facts presented, the Georgia Supreme 
Court held that there was no jurisdiction to enforce a sister-state judgment unrelated to the 
corporation’s activity in the state and based its holding on lack of statutory authorization.  Id. 
Jurisdictional practice in other states differed.  See, e.g., Stephenson Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 45 Ill. 
211, 213 (1867) (asserting that jurisdiction would be proper over an Illinois corporation in the 
county where the corporate agent was served even though the principal place of business was in 
another country (citing Peoria Ins. Co. v. Warner, 28 Ill. 429, 429 (1862))).  Courts did not clearly 
define borders between venue, personal jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction.  Thus, one case 
held that suit against a domestic corporation in a county outside the corporation’s principal place of 
business “turns on the subject matter” and cannot be waived.  Ga. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Seymour, 
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Mehren and Trautman provide no legal authority for the doctrine,267 and 
the rule probably arose as a generalization of the accepted practice by 
which service on an authorized agent at the corporation’s headquarters 
satisfied notice requirements and established a firm basis for personal 
jurisdiction for all claims against the corporation.268 
The Goodyear Dunlop Tires opinion neither explains the rule nor 
offers guidance about how to define the appropriate principal place of 
business for purposes of personal jurisdiction.269  This invites confusion 
because the Court recently resolved longstanding problems with respect 
to the definition of “principal place of business” in the federal diversity 
statute270 by defining a corporation’s principal place of business as “the 
place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and 
coordinate the corporation’s activities.”271  Because the Court offers no 
explanation for why personal jurisdiction exists at the corporation’s 
                                                                                                                       
53 Ga. 499, 500–01 (Ga. 1874), overruled in part by Lamb v. Howard, 102 S. 436 (Ga. 1920). 
Early statutes fixing jurisdiction at a “principal place of business” might have meant to 
designate the place so identified in the charter rather than the actual headquarters or center of 
business activity.  The difference is significant in insolvency proceedings—much on the minds of 
early legislators—where litigation may occur after a corporation forms but before it begins 
operations.  See Coggil v. Botsford, 29 Conn. 439, 446–47 (1861) (discussing a statute restricting 
proceedings against insolvent debtors for certain debts to probate court where partnership or 
corporation had its principal place of business). 
 267. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1141–42 (observing that a state where a 
corporation was incorporated and maintained its head office would be “analogous to that of the 
community of natural person’s domicile and habitual residence”).  The authors speculated that if a 
corporation split its administrative offices from its place of incorporation, then “presumably general 
jurisdiction should exist in either community.”  Id. at 1142 (emphasis added).  Without explaining 
why the place of administration should support jurisdiction, von Mehren and Trautman suggest that 
multiple places could exercise jurisdiction when a corporation decentralizes its administration: “[I]f 
top-level managerial and administrative functions are centered rather equally in two or more 
communities, each such community has a legitimate claim to be treated as the corporation’s head 
office for jurisdictional purposes.”  Id. 
 268. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1) (authorizing service on a corporation by delivery of the 
summons and the complaint to “an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent 
authorized . . . to receive service”). 
 269. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011) 
(mentioning the phrase “principal place of business” but never defining it (citing Brilmayer et al., 
supra note 12, at 728)). 
 270. “For the purposes of [diversity and removal jurisdiction] a corporation shall be deemed to 
be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal 
place of business . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).  The definition of corporate citizenship to 
include “principal place of business” was added in 1958.  Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 
72 Stat. 415 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)).  See generally WRIGHT, supra note 262, 
at 163. 
 271. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1186 (2010).  The Court adopted the “nerve center” 
test for identifying the principal place of business and explained that this will “normally be the place 
where the corporation maintains its headquarters.”  Id. at 1192. 
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principal place of business, lower courts familiar with the nerve-center 
test may apply that test to matters of personal jurisdiction. 
This is unfortunate because it is questionable whether the principal 
place of business should be defined the same way for both subject matter 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.272  In adopting the nerve-center 
test, the Court relied on the unique factors underpinning diversity 
jurisdiction, including the administrative simplicity of applying the 
statute and the legislative history of the statutory language.273  The Court 
offered a prudential construction of a statute fully aware that Congress 
could amend the statute to achieve a different result.274  By assigning 
citizenship to corporations in the state of their principal place of 
business, Congress intended to multiply corporate citizenship and, thus, 
reduce federal court subject matter jurisdiction in diversity cases.275  In 
contrast, assigning general jurisdiction at the principal place of business 
expands personal jurisdiction when a corporation establishes its center of 
operations in a place outside the state of incorporation.276 
The nerve-center test provides one workable method for determining 
corporate citizenship.  The test may even provide one constitutionally 
appropriate method for determining general jurisdiction.277  But the test 
does not necessarily provide the optimal definition for principal place of 
business when a corporation has substantial activity and greater contacts 
                                                          
 272. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.03, at 
34 (4th ed. 2009) (“It would be tempting to resolve personal jurisdiction issues by reference to th[e] 
case law [defining principal place of business for diversity purposes], but this is probably unwise.  
The due process law of personal jurisdiction and the law of federal subject matter jurisdiction are 
grounded on fundamentally different policies.”). 
 273. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1193–94.  The Court also relied on the fact that the “principal place” in 
the diversity statute meant one localized place like an office.  Id. at 1192–93 (citing 12 OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 495 (2d ed. 1989)).  On the contrary, discussions of general jurisdiction at the 
principal place of business typically assume jurisdiction exists throughout the state.  See, e.g., J. 
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (plurality opinion) (finding that a principal 
place of business in the forum state subjects the corporation to general jurisdiction in that state). 
 274. See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1194. 
 275. See id. at 1187–90 (discussing the reasons behind the 1958 amendment to federal diversity 
jurisdiction). 
 276. Federal courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant that is subject 
to personal jurisdiction in the state courts of the state where the federal court is located.  FED. R. CIV. 
P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
 277. The test identifies one of the administrative centers that von Mehren and Trautman 
endorsed as appropriate places for unlimited general jurisdiction.  Compare von Mehren & 
Trautman, supra note 3, at 1141–42 (“If a corporation’s managerial and administrative center is in a 
state other than its state of incorporation, [then] presumably general jurisdiction should exist in 
either community.”), with Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192–93 (suggesting that the principal place of 
business, which is usually a business’s headquarters, identifies a single locus for the “direction, 
control, and coordination” of the corporation). 
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elsewhere.  Principles of federalism and the Erie doctrine278 may counsel 
against formulating any uniform definition and in favor of deferring to 
state law definitions.  And as a matter of substantive law, courts may 
have good reasons for rejecting the nerve-center test as a particularly 
inappropriate guide for identifying a corporation’s principal place of 
business for purposes of personal jurisdiction.279 
3. When Do Activity and Contacts Make a Home? 
The Goodyear Dunlop Tires decision offers little guidance about 
when substantial corporate activity that establishes continuous and 
systematic business contacts also supports a finding that the corporation 
is “at home” outside of its places of incorporation and principal place or 
places of business.280  Considering the application of the decision’s 
standards to the defendant Goodyear USA, which had consented to 
personal jurisdiction, illustrates the uncertainty of the decision.  
Goodyear USA was not incorporated in North Carolina,281 did not 
maintain its corporate headquarters in the state,282 and conducted much 
of its manufacturing or sales business outside the state.283  Nevertheless, 
Goodyear USA operated a factory in North Carolina and engaged in a 
large volume of sales in the state.284 
On the one hand, plaintiffs could argue that Goodyear USA has the 
sort of “continuous and systematic” affiliations that make it “essentially 
at home” and thus subject to general jurisdiction in North Carolina.  On 
the other hand, Goodyear USA could counter that North Carolina, 
despite such contacts, is not an “equivalent place” to domicile in which 
the corporation is regarded “at home.”285  Early signals from lower courts 
suggest that they will dutifully repeat the new “at home” metaphor but 
                                                          
 278. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938) (holding that federal courts must 
apply state substantive law in diversity cases). 
 279. The location of executive offices has no necessary relationship to corporate activity that 
generates business or that constitutes the contacts and presence traditionally required for general 
jurisdiction.  In fact, corporations can relocate executive offices to distant sites for reasons unrelated 
to their business activities.  See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Halliburton Office Move Is Criticized, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 13, 2007, at C1 (describing the move of military contractor Halliburton’s headquarters 
from Houston, Texas, to Dubai despite continuing extensive business within the United States). 
 280. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 281. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2852 (2011). 
 282. See supra note 120. 
 283. See supra note 120. 
 284. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2850. 
 285. Id. at 2853–54. 
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will not find it a meaningful guide in their analysis of the kind of 
corporate behavior that will render general jurisdiction constitutional.286 
4. Does Service on an Agent Authorized to Receive Process Establish 
General Jurisdiction? 
The Court’s decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires does not resolve an 
issue on which lower courts have been divided: whether service of 
process on an agent appointed by a corporation to receive process287 
establishes valid general jurisdiction.288  During oral argument, Justices 
on the Court expressed keen interest in this issue.289 
                                                          
 286. In Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Pabst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., Judge Gruender quoted 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires’ “at home” language but did not apply it to the jurisdictional analysis.  646 
F.3d 589, 595–98 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction in an action 
brought in Missouri by a St. Louis manufacturer for damages allegedly caused by products it bought 
from a German manufacturer and later installed on its own product in China by plaintiff’s 
subsidiary).  In rejecting the argument that delivery of products by a subsidiary supported general 
jurisdiction, Judge Gruender observed that Goodyear Dunlop Tires held that placing products in the 
stream of commerce will not support general jurisdiction—a rule previously established by Eighth 
Circuit authority.  Id. at 597 (noting that stream-of-commerce jurisdiction is relevant only for 
purposes of specific jurisdiction) (citing Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 
F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
In Francis v. Bridgestone Corp., Judge Finch quoted Goodyear Dunlop Tires’ “at home” 
language but found that the defendant had no direct contact with the forum state.  No. 2010/30, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72804, at *24, *26–27 (D.V.I. July 6, 2011) (rejecting the theory of general 
jurisdiction as untenable but permitting limited discovery on whether specific jurisdiction existed 
over the defendant alleged to have distributed a defective tire in the Virgin Islands where it caused 
injury).  The court found that, even if another entity’s acts were attributable to the defendant, that 
entity lacked “systematic and continuous contacts with [the Virgin Islands].”  Id. at *34.  The court 
quoted Goodyear Dunlop Tires in rejecting stream-of-commerce activity as a basis for general 
jurisdiction.  Id. at *28 n.17. 
 287. Every state requires foreign corporations to register and appoint agents for service of 
process.  Rhodes, supra note 163, at 856. 
 288. See, e.g., King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570, 579 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying 
the Ninth Circuit’s “at home” requirement and prohibiting general jurisdiction where one of 
defendant’s few contacts was an agent appointed to receive process).  See generally Lee Scott 
Taylor, Note, Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of Predictability, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1181–92 (2003) (discussing the circuit split over whether service on an agent 
appointed pursuant to registration statute establishes general jurisdiction). 
 289. Justice Kagan asked Petitioners’ counsel if general jurisdiction would be proper over 
Goodyear USA if it had not consented.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 4.  Justice 
Ginsburg asked the Assistant Solicitor General, who appeared as amicus curiae, whether general 
jurisdiction would be proper based on service of an agent appointed by a corporation that otherwise 
lacked continuous and systematic contacts.  Id. at 15.  Responses from both counsel alerted the Court 
to the split of authority among the lower courts.  Id. at 5–6, 15–18.  In this posture, the Court’s 
failure to address the issue in its unanimous opinion suggests a deliberate decision to leave the 
matter open. 
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Opinions in both Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro contain 
statements that general jurisdiction over corporations exists in the state 
where the corporation is “at home,” identified as its place of 
incorporation or principal place of business.290  Because the opinions do 
not further qualify such statements, it is possible to read them as 
signaling obliquely that the method of service is unimportant. 
This is not a plausible reading.  The Court similarly observes, 
without qualification, that general jurisdiction over an individual is 
proper in the courts of his or her domicile.291  This observation hardly 
signals that the Court intends to overrule its holding that personal service 
establishes valid general jurisdiction over an individual.292  In describing 
the places where corporations are “at home” as analogous to an 
individual’s domicile,293 the Court leaves open the possibility that 
traditional methods of service on corporate agents may also support 
general jurisdiction analogous to service on an individual. 
5. Can Individuals Have a Contacts-Based Place Where They Are “At 
Home” Different From Their Domicile or Residence? 
The Goodyear Dunlop Tires decision does not involve personal 
jurisdiction over individuals.294  By treating general jurisdiction over 
corporations based on continuous and systematic contacts as analogous 
to jurisdiction at an individual’s domicile,295 the Court may be signaling 
that such contacts will not separately establish a basis for general 
jurisdiction over an individual outside the individual’s domicile or 
residence.  If so, then individuals will be subject to general jurisdiction 
only at their place of domicile and in states where they are served with 
process.  If the Court has reached a consensus that contacts and activity 
do not support general jurisdiction over individuals, then it should have  
                                                          
 290. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2850–51, 2854, 2857; see also J. McIntyre, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2797 (2011) (plurality opinion) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2850–51, 2854–57). 
 291. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2853; Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (citing Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2854). 
 292. See supra note 183. 
 293. See, e.g., Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (making a comparison between domicile and place of 
incorporation) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2854); see also supra notes 200–01 and 
accompanying text. 
 294. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
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said so.  It is questionable whether lower courts will so construe the 
opinion.296 
C. Easy Cases After Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
The Goodyear Dunlop Tires decision, read with Perkins and 
Helicopteros, definitively answers the question of whether states may 
exercise general jurisdiction over corporations in several recurring 
situations.  Justice Ginsburg’s comparative evaluation of in-state and out-
of-state sales297 indicates that a state may exercise jurisdiction over a 
corporation that completes most of its sales in the state, and her 
reasoning applies equally to other business activity.298  Conversely, the 
presence of a permanent purchasing agent, either a corporation or an 
individual, in a state will not be enough to establish general jurisdiction 
over a nonresident corporation that conducts most of its business out of 
state.299  Similarly, the presence of nonexclusive sales agents will not 
                                                          
 296. Less than two months after Goodyear Dunlop Tires, a federal court cited the opinion in a 
decision finding general jurisdiction over a nonresident individual based on continuous and 
systematic contacts of a corporation that the court regarded as the individual’s surrogate.  Harrelson 
v. Seung Heun Lee, No. 09-11714-RGS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79383, at *20 (D. Mass. July 21, 
2011) (denying a motion to dismiss and finding general jurisdiction in Massachusetts over an 
Arizona citizen for rape allegedly committed in South Korea), dismissed by 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
(D. Mass. Jan. 31, 2012).  The court quoted Justice Ginsburg’s edict that “the paradigm forum for 
the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.”  Id. at *11 (quoting Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2853).  The trial judge, however, found general jurisdiction over the 
individual based on his domination and control of the yoga network, thus supporting piercing the 
corporate veil.  Id. at *13–14, *17. 
 297. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2856–57 (comparing defendants’ sales to the 
level of activity in Perkins and Helicopteros). 
 298. While the Court in Helicopteros Nacionales held that purchases and related visits to the 
forum are not enough to support general jurisdiction, it did so in a case where the defendant was 
engaged primarily in providing transportation services outside of Texas.  See 466 U.S. 408, 409–10, 
418 (1984).  The decision does not preclude general jurisdiction over a corporation that engages 
solely in purchasing that occurs mainly in the forum state.  On the contrary, in such a case general 
jurisdiction would be proper either because the forum state is the corporation’s principal place of 
business or because the defendant has sufficient continuous and systematic contacts to make the state 
its legal home. 
The Court’s comparative treatment of selling activity in Goodyear Dunlop Tires seems to 
support general jurisdiction in the state where most of the direct purchases or sales occur, regardless 
of whether the corporation maintains some physical presence in that state.  See supra notes 162–63 
and accompanying text (discussing comparisons of overall sales and their impact on jurisdiction).  
The outcome is less certain in cases where the corporation acts through by intermediaries or where a 
corporation engages in additional types of activity, such as when it engages in a plurality of sales or 
purchases in the forum state but engages in the majority of purchases or sales in other states. 
 299. This is implied by the Court’s holding in Helicopteros where the corporate defendant 
maintained a permanent presence of rotating agents in the state.  See supra note 112. 
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subject a nonresident corporation to general jurisdiction in a state where 
it does not do most of its business.300 
Additional facts like the presence of permanent offices, warehouses, 
or substantial assets in the forum will help support a finding of general 
jurisdiction.  Such facts will not be present when corporations engage 
solely in interstate commerce over the Internet.301  When a corporation 
engages in most of its commercial activity in one state, that state may 
properly exercise general jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process 
Clause.302  It is less clear whether a state might properly exercise 
jurisdiction when the nonresident corporation engages in a higher 
volume of sales in that state than in any other, or when most of its 
activity is spread among a few states.303 
The Court’s categorical distinction in Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
between specific and general jurisdiction—together with its insistence 
that contacts enhancing specific jurisdiction do not establish a proper 
basis for general jurisdiction304—suggest an answer to a recurring 
                                                          
 300. This is implied by the Court’s treatment of sales in Goodyear Dunlop Tires.  Though the 
Court refused to attribute contacts to the foreign corporations based on a single-enterprise theory, 
Goodyear USA apparently placed orders to and on behalf of the foreign affiliates.  131 S. Ct. at 
2852, 2857.  The Court did not discuss agency, which may indicate its irrelevance to the Court.  
Solicitation of sales for the foreign affiliates was merely incidental to other local business of 
Goodyear USA because it was not the exclusive sales agency for the foreign corporations.  See id. at 
2852. 
 301. There is growing criticism of the judicial tests and potentially overbroad exercise of 
jurisdiction based on Internet contacts.  See, e.g., Eric C. Hawkins, Note, General Jurisdiction and 
Internet Contacts: What Role, If Any, Should the Zippo Sliding Scale Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2371, 2387–89 (2006) (discussing criticism of a judicial test for general 
jurisdiction over defendants engaged in Internet commerce as resulting in excessive flexibility and 
uncertainty); Quinn K. Nemeyer, Comment, Don’t Hate the Player, Hate the Game: Applying the 
Traditional Concepts of General Jurisdiction to Internet Contacts, 52 LOY. L. REV. 147, 148 (2006) 
(arguing that analysis focusing exclusively on quantitative sales territory may subject defendants to 
jurisdiction in unforeseen forums); Kristin Woeste, Comment, General Jurisdiction and the Internet: 
Sliding Too Far?, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 793, 793–94 (2004) (“There is no [judicial] consensus [for] 
how to [evaluate] web-based contacts for [purposes of] general jurisdiction . . . .”).  Members of the 
Court have expressed concern with the application of jurisdictional rules to Internet activity.  See, 
e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(raising questions about the application of strict rules proposed by the plurality to common Internet 
transactions). 
 302. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  The Commerce Clause might provide a separate ground for 
limiting state court jurisdiction over unrelated out-of-state sales.  See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 303. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion does not resolve the issue that has divided lower courts.  See 
supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text; cf. Gator.Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 
1074 (9th Cir. 2003) (subjecting an Internet vendor to general jurisdiction based on the volume of 
sales in California, despite the fact that most of the sales were in other states), dismissed as moot by 
398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).   
 304. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 131 S. Ct. at 2855. 
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practical problem that the Court has never directly addressed.  The 
Court’s analysis strongly suggests that while a state may properly subject 
a defendant to specific jurisdiction for claims relating to its activity in the 
state, it may not simultaneously subject the defendant to general 
jurisdiction for claims unrelated to its activity in the forum.  This is 
arguably the wrong result as a matter of policy and tradition. 
D. Hard Cases After Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
1. Presence Based on Offices, Facilities, or Centralized Activities in 
State 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires does not answer the question of whether a 
nonresident corporation is “at home” and subject to general jurisdiction 
in a state where it does not do most of its business but where it maintains 
an office or other facilities or where it regularly employs agents who 
conduct in-state business.305  The decision also does not answer whether 
a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction when it maintains a 
transient but recurring presence in the forum state and also coordinates 
sales or other commercial activity from that state that covers a multi-state 
region.  For example, the opinion does not indicate whether a foreign 
manufacturer is subject to general jurisdiction in a state where it 
repeatedly meets with buyers and promotes products that are delivered in 
other states.306 
2. Enterprise Theory 
Leaving until tomorrow the type of circumstance that support 
attributing one corporation’s activity or contacts to another under an 
enterprise theory,307 the Court invites future litigation without providing 
                                                          
 305. The opinion provides no answer to the question raised during argument as to whether North 
Carolina could subject Goodyear USA to general jurisdiction based on the fact that Goodyear 
operates a manufacturing facility and engages in commercial activity in the state.  See supra notes 17 
and 289 and accompanying text. 
 306. The president of the foreign manufacturer in Nicastro attended a trade show in Nevada that 
may have resulted in the manufacturer’s importing products into New Jersey.  Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 
2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  General jurisdiction would not be proper in Nevada because trade 
shows were held throughout the country.  A harder case would arise if Nevada hosted an annual 
trade fair that served as the commercial center through which the foreign corporation coordinated 
sales. 
 307. See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
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insight as to the legal source of the as yet-unarticulated rules to govern 
such attribution.  May a forum state apply its own law governing the 
piercing of a corporate veil?  Must it apply the law of the corporation’s 
other “home” states?  Does the Due Process Clause provide a separate 
source of rules regarding such enterprise-based jurisdiction?  Stay tuned. 
E. Prospects for State Legislation 
States have the power to avoid constitutional uncertainties and to 
provide greater clarity by restricting the scope of long-arm personal 
jurisdiction.  For example, state legislation could remove much of the 
uncertainty created by Goodyear Dunlop Tires by removing general 
jurisdiction based on service on a corporate agent within the state and 
restricting general jurisdiction to corporations that incorporate in or 
maintain their principal places of business in the state.  State legislation 
could further avoid constitutional problems by defining principal place of 
business so narrowly that it would satisfy any constitutional demands—
perhaps by defining such a place as the corporate headquarters where 
management level decision-making takes place.  Nevertheless, 
legislatures have generally refrained from shrinking personal jurisdiction 
for the purpose of avoiding constitutional controversies.  Indeed, the 
controversies have arisen, as in Goodyear Dunlop Tires, precisely 
because state legislatures and courts have attempted to expand personal 
jurisdiction beyond clearly demarcated traditional categories. 
Although state legislatures cannot authorize state courts to exercise 
jurisdiction where doing so violates the Due Process Clause, states may 
effectively provide local forums for their residents by enacting new 
remedies that expand the range of responsible parties to include more 
defendants that can be subjected to their courts’ general jurisdiction.  For 
example, legislatures could respond to the restriction of specific 
jurisdiction over nonresident tortfeasors by enacting direct-action statutes 
that authorize proceedings directly against tortfeasors’ insurance 
companies.  The insurance companies may be subject to general 
jurisdiction even if the tortfeasors are not.   
Direct actions were once on law reformers agendas in several 
states.308  The Court alleviated the need for direct actions by recognizing 
                                                          
 308. See generally Jonathan C. Augustine, Other States Should “Get with the Program” and 
Follow Louisiana’s Lead: An Examination of Louisiana’s Direct Action Statute and Its Application 
in the Marine Insurance Industry, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 109, 113–17 (2002) (discussing the history of 
the Louisiana direct action statutes); Alston Johnson, The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 43 LA. L. 
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the expanding power of states over nonresident tortfeasors.309  The 
restriction of personal jurisdiction announced in Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
and Nicastro provides new incentives for enacting such remedies.  The 
broadest possible statutes would impose direct liability on any person 
who has a duty to indemnify the foreign corporation for claims arising 
out of injuries in the state.  Such a statute would authorize direct action 
against a foreign manufacturer’s insurance company in any state where 
the insurer is subject to general jurisdiction and would similarly 
authorize such actions in the home state of any corporation that has a 
duty to indemnify the tortfeasor.310 
F. Prospects for Federal Legislation 
Scholars have generally assumed that, like the states, Congress may 
impose further restrictions on personal jurisdiction but is powerless to 
expand personal jurisdiction beyond the limits recognized by the 
Court.311  Unlike states, however, federal courts have never been 
authorized to exercise the broadest possible personal jurisdiction.  For 
most cases, personal jurisdiction of a federal court is the same as that of 
the courts of the state in which it sits.312 
Although a state court might lack personal jurisdiction based on the 
absence of sufficient contacts within the state, a federal court sitting in 
the same state could constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction if 
there were sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole.313  For 
                                                                                                                       
REV. 1455, 1455–66 (1983) (discussing the history of direct action statutes). 
 309. See Parts III.B.1–2. 
 310. Imposing a greater legal obligation on insurers than they assumed by contract does not 
violate due process.  Watson v. Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 73–74 (1954) (holding 
that Louisiana’s interest in protecting persons injured in the state permitted recovery under direct 
action against a nonresident insurer, notwithstanding a provision in the insurance agreement that 
prohibited such claims until after recovery of a judgment against the tortfeasor). 
 311. Juenger discusses prospects for federal legislation in the context of proposals for 
federalizing the law for recognizing judgments.  See Juenger, supra note 238, at 166–67.  He 
assumes that “the Supreme Court’s insistence on the constitutional nature of jurisdictional law” 
would present an obstacle to any federal law purporting to expand personal jurisdiction.  Id. at 167.  
Juenger also assumes that political or constitutional considerations would impede federal legislation 
limiting state court jurisdiction.  Id. at 166–67.  Borchers similarly assumes that the constitutional 
ground of the Supreme Court’s decisions preclude federal legislation or treaties expanding personal 
jurisdiction.  Borchers, supra note 18, at 133–34.  He suggests that state long-arm statutes or federal 
legislation could provide clarity only by imposing restrictions on jurisdiction.  Id. at 133. 
 312. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (authorizing personal jurisdiction over a defendant “who is 
subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is 
located”). 
 313. The issue was raised by Justice O’Connor in Asahi.  480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (plurality 
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example, where a foreign defendant’s product causes injury in the state 
but the foreign defendant does not have minimum contacts with the state, 
due process would prevent state courts from exercising personal 
jurisdiction.  In contrast, due process would not prevent federal courts in 
the state from exercising personal jurisdiction so long as the foreign 
defendant had minimum contacts with other states or with the United 
States as a whole.   
The problem, however, is that federal courts are not currently 
authorized to exercise such broad jurisdiction.  Though the political 
prospects for enlarging federal jurisdiction appear poor at the moment,314 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Nicastro invited federal legislation 
to address this jurisdictional gap.315 
Congress could remedy this situation by crafting a new federal cause 
of action for injuries suffered in the United States as a result of activity 
that occurs outside the United States.316  The new cause of action would 
                                                                                                                       
opinion) (“We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien 
defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts . . . .”).  No bill has apparently yet been 
introduced authorizing such jurisdiction.  Cf. The Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act 
of 2009, S. 1606, 111th Cong. §§ 3, 5 (2009) (requiring “foreign manufacturers of products imported 
into the United States” to appoint agents, which constitutes consent, but not providing for personal 
jurisdiction over defendants that do not appoint agents).  The Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States of America argued that permitting North Carolina to exercise personal jurisdiction would 
“[d]amage [e]fforts by the United States to [c]omplete a [t]reaty on [j]urisdiction and [j]udgments.”  
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 18–21, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) 
(No. 10-76). 
 314. Viewing restraint of jurisdiction as conducive to economic development and trade, the 
Obama administration filed a brief in support of the position of the defendants in Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (No. 10-76). 
 315. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality opinion) 
(“[A] defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but 
not of any particular State.”). 
 316. It would be possible but unnecessary to state that such causes of action would require the 
defendant to have minimum contacts with the United States.  The Due Process Clause would 
independently operate to prevent jurisdiction in the absence of such contacts.  See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1.  Congressional authority to enact the new claim would derive from the power to 
regulate interstate and international commerce under the Commerce Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3.  Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) 
(giving district courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States”).  To avoid unnecessary litigation over the outer reaches of the 
Commerce Clause, it would probably be desirable to list specific kinds of activity that fall within the 
cause of action.  For example, the statute might apply to items manufactured for sale outside the 
country in which they were manufactured. 
Alternatively, Congress could enact a statute that authorizes nationwide service of process over 
corporations that engage in such substantial activity in the United States that the federal courts may 
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potentially place a greater burden on federal judicial systems, channeling 
into federal court cases arising under state law that were historically 
within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of state courts.317  But by 
restricting the cause of action to cases over which no state court has 
personal jurisdiction, Congress would avoid interfering with existing 
state judicial authority. 
It is doubtful whether less aggressive methods could effectively close 
the jurisdictional gap.  For example, federal legislation that creates a new 
cause of action but requires its litigation in state court318 or federal 
legislation that attempts to authorize state court personal jurisdiction 
based on a defendant’s contacts with the United States as a whole would 
both fail to avoid the objection that Congress lacks authority to expand 
the personal jurisdiction of the state courts beyond what due process 
permits.319 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Goodyear Dunlop Tires suggests the 
existence of a second jurisdictional gap.  In some cases, foreign 
corporations based outside the United States could have continuous and 
systematic contacts with the United States as a whole so that federal 
courts could constitutionally exercise general jurisdiction, yet the 
corporations might simultaneously lack sufficient contacts to permit 
                                                                                                                       
constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over such corporations.  This would extend to 
diversity cases the procedure that currently authorizes personal jurisdiction over defendants in 
federal question claims when the defendants are not subject to personal jurisdiction in any state.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)(A) (authorizing personal jurisdiction for claims based on federal law over a 
defendant when “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general 
jurisdiction”).  Indeed, Congress could achieve this result by eliminating Rule 4(k)(2)’s first eight 
words—“[f]or a claim that arises under federal law.”  See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).  This change could 
not be effected so readily by a mere change in the rules.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (limiting 
rulemaking to rules of practice and procedure that do not enlarge substantive rights); FED. R. CIV. P. 
82 (stating that federal rules do not extend jurisdiction of federal courts). 
Enlarging personal jurisdiction over claims currently within the subject matter jurisdiction of 
the federal courts would provide an incomplete solution to the jurisdictional gap.  It would still not 
provide a forum for cases that fail to meet the technical requirements for federal diversity of 
citizenship. 
 317. The statute would authorize federal jurisdiction over a large number of cases based on non-
federal law that were not previously within federal court subject matter jurisdiction based on 
diversity of citizenship or some other ground of federal jurisdiction. 
 318. There is ample authority for giving state courts exclusive original jurisdiction over federal 
claims.  Indeed, the first Judiciary Act did not give such jurisdiction to federal trial courts.  See 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).  Moreover, Congress has previously enacted 
legislation to address a loophole in state law but at the same time required litigation in state courts.  
See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006); Thompson v. 
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 182–83, 187 (1988) (holding that PKPA requires states to enforce custody 
determinations from other states but does not create a federal cause of action). 
 319. See supra note 311. 
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general jurisdiction in any individual state court.  An example would be 
an English corporation headquartered in London, the sole business of 
which consists of selling toxic American flag candy throughout the 
United States that is purchased from vendors in East Asia.  If the 
corporation spreads its sales evenly throughout the United States, then no 
state would qualify as the corporation’s principal place of business.  
Thus, the corporation would fail to have sufficient continuous and 
systematic contacts in any single state to support general jurisdiction. 
A federal statute authorizing personal jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants that cause injuries in states would fill the jurisdictional gap 
for most cases.  But such a statute authorizes a form of specific 
jurisdiction that would still leave U.S. citizens deprived of a domestic 
forum when their claim arose outside the United States.  This would be 
the case if a child who is a citizen of the United States ingested the toxic 
candy in Canada.  Congress could close this gap by authorizing federal 
courts to exercise general jurisdiction over foreign corporations engaged 
in continuous and systematic business in the United States, but it is 
questionable whether Congress will have the political will to do so in the 
immediate future. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The consensus of the Supreme Court in Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
conceals important areas of divergence with immediate practical 
consequences.  On the one hand, the opinion can be read narrowly as 
affirming the exclusive classification of cases into specific and general 
jurisdiction and disallowing general jurisdiction over foreign 
manufacturers based solely on sporadic sales through intermediaries.  On 
the other hand, it can be read broadly as effectively ending general 
jurisdiction over nonresident corporations by restricting general 
jurisdiction to corporations that incorporate under the laws of the state, 
maintain their principal place of business in the state, or have such a 
comparably close connection with the state so that they are “at home” in 
the state. 
Rejecting general jurisdiction under the facts of the case, Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion conflates a variety of approaches but fails to 
communicate a coherent, shared vision of the underlying principles of 
personal jurisdiction.320  Avoiding divisive details such as the need for 
                                                          
 320. Twitchell observed that lack of policy analysis indicated that “courts are unsure about what 
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physical presence in the state, the broad opinion comports equally with 
two incongruous agendas.  It comports with liberal reform-oriented 
proposals to rationalize personal jurisdiction by eliminating most forms 
of general jurisdiction while expanding specific jurisdiction.321 And it 
comports with libertarian proposals to curtail both general jurisdiction 
and specific jurisdiction.322 
This Article argues that even the most generous reading of the 
opinion leaves important practical questions unanswered.  Does service 
on an agent confer valid general jurisdiction?  Will contacts-based 
general jurisprudence apply to individuals as well as corporations?  Can 
significant and continuous contacts support general jurisdiction in 
multiple states or are they the functional equivalent of the principal place 
of business?  Can a corporation maintain more than one principal place 
of business?  Is the principal place of business defined by the nerve-
center or some other test? 
The Court’s curtailment of specific jurisdiction in Nicastro will 
impel plaintiffs seeking a local forum to invoke general jurisdiction in 
ever more cases.  This will require lower courts to address the host of 
issues evaded by the broad and ambiguous opinion in Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires that was capable of commanding consensus. 
                                                                                                                       
policies support this exercise of [general] jurisdiction.”  Twitchell, supra note 103, at 637.  Perhaps, 
after Goodyear Dunlop Tires, the observation should be amended: lack of policy analysis may 
indicate that individual justices are sure about what policies support jurisdiction.  They just cannot 
agree about what the policies are. 
 321. See supra note 248–50 and accompanying text (citing von Mehren and Trautman, supra 
note 3, 1164–65, 1167–68, 1172, 1177).  But see Borchers, supra note 18, at 139 (“General 
jurisdiction’s defects cannot be separated from those of specific jurisdiction.”). 
 322. See supra note 256 (citing J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) 
(plurality opinion)). 
